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ABSTRACT 
This thesis bridges the knowledge gap between Title 10 Active Duty and Title 32 
National Guard in order to breakdown cultural barriers and reach unity of effort for 
response operations in the homeland. Regrettably, a unified response was missing among 
Title 10 Active Duty and Title 32 National Guard members following Hurricane Katrina. 
Since then, initiatives based in doctrine, statutes and formal recommendations have been 
established to address unity of effort, however, a serious knowledge gap remains. Future 
threats, manmade or natural, will require a unified response to save lives and mitigate 
suffering. Case studies on the Israeli Home Front Command and the Florida Division of 
Emergency Management help determine best practices to reach unity of effort between 
Title 10 Active Duty and Title 32 National Guard. Appreciating the varying perspectives, 
concerns and competing interests among state and federal stakeholders on command and 
control of military forces in the homeland is vital to moving forward. Understanding 
culture and context among Title 10 Active Duty and Title 32 National Guard will 
facilitate learning and resolve conflict. Progress is underway to reach unity of effort 
through the Council of Governors on dual-status command and this thesis recommends 
next steps to enhance efforts.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Yet with collective determination, unity of effort, and effective 
organizational change, the true legacy of Katrina can be that of a catalyst 
that triggered a real and lasting improvement to our national preparedness. 
– The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Unity of effort is a fundamental principle in the National Response Framework 
(NRF) to express the necessity for a successful, coordinated and unified emergency 
response effort in the homeland (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2008, p. 10). 
Depending on the severity on an incident, stakeholders at the local, state and federal 
levels all have a role when disasters and emergencies occur in the homeland. The United 
States (U.S.) military is often a federal partner in disaster and emergency response due in 
part to the unique capabilities and amount of trained personnel that can be brought to 
bear. Supporting disaster and emergency response operations in the homeland is not a 
new mission for the U.S. military; however, the expectation is that military support will 
be effective, efficient and seamless among response mission partners. That being said, 
achieving unity of effort in the homeland is not an operational reality, specifically for 
Title 10 Active Duty and Title 32 National Guard. Several components need to be 
addressed up front to explain this complex situation. First, understanding what unity of 
effort means or at least how this terminology has been prescribed in the United States. 
Second, discerning how unity of effort connects local, state and federal organizations. 
Third, considering how the military, Title 10 Active Duty and Title 32 National Guard, fit 
into the national approach of unity of effort in the homeland. 
1. Unity of Effort in the Homeland  
According to the NRF, “success requires unity of effort, which respects the chain 
of command of each participating organization while harnessing seamless coordination 
across jurisdictions in support of common objectives” (Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2008, p. 10). The NRF further addresses unified command and control, which 
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are concepts that define structure to the coordination of multiple stakeholders during an 
operation. While the NRF outlines objectives for various federal agencies and the roles 
and responsibilities of other partners, it is an overarching strategy or guideline for the 
nation at large and it does not go into any detail about planning with the military and 
response operations. Based on the NRF doctrine, an obligation for federal, state, local, 
tribal, private sector and nongovernmental organizations exists to work together both 
prior to and during a domestic emergency to create a “national approach.” However, it is 
entirely incumbent upon these entities to adhere to this obligation, as no statutory 
requirement or mandate exist requiring such coordination (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 2008). In addition to the NRF and with the same circumstance of 
limited mandate authority, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 or HSPD-5, 
Management of Domestic Incidents, directs the Secretary of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) to be responsible for coordinating the federal government to work with 
mission partners at state and local levels, and private and nongovernmental organizations 
to develop an efficient and effective domestic response to an incident (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2009). However, creating unity of effort in realistic terms that 
mission partners can agree upon can be difficult when schools of thought vary depending 
on the organization. Wormuth and Witowsky pointedly address unity of effort, or the lack 
thereof, in domestic emergency response operations in Managing the Next Domestic 
Catastrophe: Ready (or Not?):  
No single government agency, private company, or charitable organization 
can possibly provide all that will be required in the face of a major 
disaster. The key to a successful response to major disasters in the future 
will be finding ways to leverage the particular capabilities of many parts 
of society while these diverse disciplines and tools are brought together 
for maximum effect. Despite the tireless exertions of many dedicated 
individuals at all levels of government and across many sectors of society 
over the past few years, the United States has not yet been able to achieve 
this kind of unity of effort. (Wormuth & Witowsky, 2008, p. 1) 
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The real-world application of unity of effort for local, state and federal mission partners 
is complex. The challenge that exists, specifically for Title 10 and Title 32 military 
members, is determining how to create unity of effort before a domestic emergency 
incident occurs so that their capabilities and assets can help save lives and mitigate 
suffering.  
2. Local, State, and Federal Interconnectedness 
Acknowledged in the National Response Framework, an incident may occur that 
“exceeds or is anticipated to exceed local, tribal, or State resources, [and] the Governor 
can request Federal assistance under the Stafford Act” (Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2008, p. 4). When a state governor seeks support through the Robert T. Stafford 
Act and the federal government is requested to support a state, the concept of unity of 
effort becomes fundamental and fundamentally difficult as various agencies, their assets 
and personnel are brought together collectively to support a state.  
Learning from Hurricane Katrina, “time equals lives saved” and critical to 
response time in a domestic emergency response mission is having a unified response 
effort in place among all homeland security mission partners to ensure an effective 
response (The White House, 2006, p. 53). Depending on the incident, the Department of 
Defense and other federal agencies may be asked to support the lead federal agency 
and/or state civilian authorities. As components of the U.S. military apparatus, it is 
incumbent upon Title 10 and Title 32 military members to develop unity of effort so they 
are well synched when supporting a state and the lead federal agency as part of the 
national approach to emergency response in the homeland to save lives and mitigate 
suffering. To be clear, both Title 10 federal military and Title 32 National Guard are 
elements of the larger national response enterprise in the homeland. Regrettably, a unified 
response was specifically missing among Title 10 federal military and Title 32 National 
Guard members following Hurricane Katrina (The White House, 2006, p. 43). One of the 
major lessons learned from response operations was that the “Department of Defense 
should ensure the transformation of the National Guard is focused on increased 
integration with active duty forces for homeland security plans and activities” (The White 
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House, 2006, p. 43). Unfortunately, endeavors since Hurricane Katrina to address unity 
of effort have not yet yielded the results necessary where stakeholders, specifically state 
governors, the National Guard, the Department of Defense (DoD) and U.S. Northern 
Command (USNORTHCOM), feel a consensus has been reached and unity of effort has 
been achieved.  
3. The “Title” Paradox 
Unity of effort and responsibilities can become more complicated for the military 
when Title 10 federal military and Title 32 National Guard members are expected to 
respond and operate together but under separate chains of command. While governors are 
the commanders for their sovereign state and control their National Guard, the President 
of the United States is also sovereign under Article II Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution 
as the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces. A paradoxical circumstance 
ensues when Title 10 federal military members enter a state to augment Title 32 National 
Guardsmen, under the Stafford Act, in support of a domestic emergency response effort. 
The Title 10 response mission in the homeland is known as Defense Support to Civil 
Authorities (DSCA), which is led by USNORTHCOM. At a basic level, federal military 
members have been primarily trained and focused for overseas contingencies for the last 
ten years and do not sufficiently “understand the constraints placed upon them by the 
body of statutes, regulations, and presidential orders pertaining to responding to disasters 
and incidents” in the homeland (U.S. Army, 2010). Conversely, Title 32 National 
Guardsmen are inherently knowledgeable and properly trained for missions within their 
state or in support of another state in the homeland. As such, a knowledge problem 
remains among Title 10 federal military and Title 32 National Guardsmen that has 
impacted how these components communicate and work toward unity of effort. Further 
explanation and execution of roles, responsibilities and the processes by which each 
component is incorporated in a unified response needs to be addressed. The political 
dynamics and legal mechanisms involved in developing unity of effort among these 
military components must also be available for public discourse.  
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In a memo by the Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, on “Improving 
Coordination and Unity of Effort with State Responders during Emergency Response 
Operations,” Secretary Gates provides direction for the development of command and 
control options that will enable federal military forces “to consult, coordinate with, and 
respond to state authorities” (January 13, 2009). This Secretary of Defense direction not 
only stresses the department’s focus on this important issue internally, but also 
acknowledges that considerable work must be done to cultivate a collective 
understanding for unity of effort. Consequently in 2010, the DoD developed a concept to 
build a consensus with the National Guard and governors called “Improving Unity of 
Effort: Direct Support Initiative,” which focused on creating a unity of effort among 
states, the National Guard, the DoD and USNORTHCOM for emergency response 
operations (Center for Homeland Defense and Security, 2010). This concept eventually 
became an approved “plan” called the Joint Action Plan for Developing Unity of Effort. 
The success of the unity of effort initiative was directly linked to the congressionally-
mandated Council of Governors, which was established to work with the DoD and DHS 
on issues of significance to state governors (The White House, 2010b). The Council of 
Governors consists of 10 appointed state governors, the Secretary of Defense, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, Commander of USNORTHCOM and the Chief of the 
National Guard Bureau in addition to other federal officials. One of the objectives the 
Council of Governors is working towards bridging the gap between governors and the 
DoD regarding the command and control issues associated with unity of effort and the 
use of Federal Title 10 military members who are employed in a state. Trust is an 
underlying issue that must be resolved and the Council of Governors, National Guard, the 
DoD and USNORTHCOM are collectively working towards this goal (Center for 
Homeland Defense and Security, 2010). As state governors continue to work hand-in-
hand with the DoD, the National Guard and USNORTHCOM on the Council of 
Governors, trust is being built and strong partnerships are emerging. Secretary Robert 
Gates directly expressed his gratitude and appreciation to Governor Gregiore for her 
support on the Joint Action Plan on Developing Unity of Effort and stated that the “plan 
marks an historic moment in the relationship between the States and the Federal 
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Government, as well as a critical step forward in living up to our mutual obligation to 
protect American lives in the face of catastrophes” (Gates, 2011). The establishment of 
the Joint Action Plan on Developing Unity of Effort is clearly a huge step in the right 
direction to build trust and a stronger rapport between the DoD and states, which will be 
addressed in subsequent chapters.  
Once trust is achieved among these partners, an opportunity may exist to address 
other aspects of federal military support in the homeland. Included in the overarching 
knowledge problem regarding unity of effort, is the issue of accessing Title 10 federal 
reserve military members for domestic emergencies. Domestic emergencies, natural or 
manmade, may occur that are utterly catastrophic when a state or several states have 
exhausted the capabilities of their National Guard and a coordinated response to include 
Title 10 military members, both active and reserve, may be necessary (Commission on 
the National Guard and Reserve, 2008, p. 24). Title 10 federal reserve units may be 
within close proximity to support an emergency but current laws hinder their response, 
which “defies logic and unnecessarily endangers American lives” (Nagl & Sharp, 2010). 
Many active duty forces were called upon to respond to Hurricane Katrina, including the 
82nd Airborne from Fort Bragg, NC and the 4th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry 
Division out of Fort Hood, TX (Army News Service, 2005). While the active duty 
augmented National Guard efforts and provided support, a number of federal reserve 
forces were closer to the disaster but language in Title 10 Section 12304 defining “certain 
emergencies” prevented the DoD from calling upon those forces to respond. Several such 
federal reserve units in hurricane-affected states are: 560th RED HORSE Squadron, Air 
Force Reserve Command, Charleston, South Carolina; Helicopter Anti-Submarine 
Squadron Seventy Five [HS 75], U.S. Navy Reserve, Jacksonville, Florida; 4th Landing 
Support Battalion, Marine Forces Reserve, New Orleans, Louisiana; 926th Engineer 
Group, U.S. Army Reserve, Montgomery, Alabama (National Guard Association of the 
United States, 2009). Further, some individuals in federal reserve units chose to volunteer 
to support response operations following Hurricane Katrina and according to the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) it negatively impacted unity of effort because 
it was took more time to organize volunteers who were not a part of the chain of 
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command (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2006). If unity of effort was 
mutually defined and upheld among mission partners in the DoD and states, there may be 
little hesitation to exclude federal reserve forces as part of the total Title 10 federal 
military support and response effort to a domestic emergency or incident. Senior military 
leaders in the National Guard and Reserve echoed the need for access to Title 10 federal 
reserve forces and urged Congress that “legislation should be altered so that the Reserves 
can be accessible during natural disasters and Homeland Security-related matters” 
(Ybarra, 2011). This subject was under consideration for the Council of Governors and 
Secretary Robert Gates restated the Council’s intent that “a legislative proposal to close 
this gap would be most effective if it came from the Council of Governors…ensuring that 
the almost 400,000 Reservists…can be called upon under this new authority to serve the 
public more effectively during national disasters” (Gates, 2011). Ultimately, trust and 
partnership must remedy the knowledge problem about the use of Title 10 federal 
military forces within states to fulfill expectations properly for an effective and efficient 
emergency response effort.  
Although many initiatives, both formally written in doctrine and directives and 
socially constructed, address unity of effort for domestic emergency response operations, 
a serious gap remains among Tile 10 federal military and Title 32 National Guard 
members. Cultural divides, distrust and concerns over command and control of forces has 
muddied the waters of communication to the point where individuals and groups tend to 
talk past each other instead of to each other. The debate has morphed into a “wicked 
problem” where fragmentation has stifled the process of reaching compromise and “the 
people involved see themselves as more separate than united, and in which information 
and knowledge are chaotic and scattered” (Conklin, 2006, p. 2). Clearly defining what 
unity of effort means operationally among the U.S. military needs to be resolved to reach 
consensus and support a “national approach” to domestic response (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2009). Further, if unity of effort is reached among Title 10 Active 
Duty and Title 32 National Guard there may be little reservation to adding Title 10 
federal reserve forces to the mix of potential forces to support domestic emergency 
response operations.  
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Understanding unity of effort doctrinally, the interconnectedness of local, state 
and federal mission partners, as well as the U.S. military elements to the federal support 
piece of emergency response, are key components when addressing a unified effort 
among Title 10 federal forces and Title 32 National Guard. As previously stated, a 
knowledge problem still exists that hinders these forces from executing unity of effort as 
an operational reality. The next few chapters examine what has been said about this 
paradox called “unity of effort” and the historical views and opinions that have shaped 
the current landscape where consensus in now at the forefront. To delve into these 
matters, several key questions lead the research to address the knowledge problem in 
subsequent chapters of the thesis. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis addresses the complexity of issues that stifle the development of unity 
of effort among the U.S. military, Title 10 federal military and Title 32 National Guard, 
and the potential solutions or lessons learned that may be applied to improve U.S. 
military disaster response operations in the homeland. The major questions driving the 
thesis research are the following. 
• What events, experiences, opinions and/or comments have shaped the 
current landscape between Title 10 Active Duty and Title 32 National 
Guard regarding unity of effort in the homeland? How have politics, 
federalism, command and control and other relevant concerns played a 
role?  
• Is there a formal mechanism that the DoD, USNORTHCOM, the National 
Guard and state governors can create to reach a consensus on “unity of 
effort,” to the degree it can be operational and sustained during domestic 
emergency response efforts? 
• Are there lessons to be learned from other organizations, military 
establishments, and/or governments that may be analyzed and applied to 
Title 10 and Title 32 military members to reach a consensus and develop 
“unity of effort?” 
• Are there domestic emergencies so utterly catastrophic that a unified 
response under the auspices of “unity of effort” may include the support of 
federal reserve forces? 
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In addition to guiding the research of this thesis, these research questions have been 
formulated to answer hypotheses that underscore a need for unity of effort by 
emphasizing the importance of relationship building. 
C. HYPOTHESES 
Unity of effort has not been achieved in the homeland among mission partners 
and solutions may exist that can be applied to build trust and strong partnerships to 
enhance unified disaster response operations. The stronger relationships and partnerships 
are before an incident occurs, the more effectiveness and unity for response operations 
will increase during and after an incident. As many in the homeland security apparatus 
say, it is not prudent to exchange business cards on the battlefield. Much of the solution 
to building a unified response is creating opportunities for leaders of organizations and 
their staff to meet, train and exercise regularly with each other. However, before this can 
occur, a top-down leadership decision must exist to do so. While opportunities for 
homeland security professionals to train and exercise together do exist, it is necessary to 
have an increased emphasis on specifically creating synergy among T32 and T10 military 
members who may be called upon for domestic emergency response operations. A top-
down approach from leadership within the DoD, the National Guard, state Adjutants 
Generals and state governors is necessary given the unpredictable nature of the next 
emergency or disaster. While synergy may exist among T10 and T32 members of the 
military in select states because of joint experiences responding together to incidents or 
through exercises, not all states and localities share this experience. To develop a 
crosscutting, all encompassing sense of unity, a policy shift must occur that impacts 
cultural dynamics that challenges disparate points of view among the active duty and 
reserve component personnel. Legislation cannot be adopted to force a culture shift; this 
will not work, as this is a leadership and cultural issue that can be solved with increased 
emphasis on partnership and trust.  
Identifying the significance of this research supports the hypotheses and outlines 
the importance of researching a layered approach focused on relationships and 
operational structures to create unity out in the homeland.  
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D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This thesis contributes to the ongoing efforts among the homeland security 
community to develop unity of effort. Although an abundance of guidance, directives and 
statutes exist to help members of the military understand unity of effort conceptually, 
little has been done to establish a comprehensive, long-term construct to forge trusting 
relationships to ensure unity of effort during a disaster response in the homeland. Real 
initiatives are currently underway with leadership from the DoD, USNORTHCOM, the 
National Guard and state governors that could help turn the tide in this regard. This thesis 
helps fill the knowledge gap among these organizations, the military members and 
civilians at the federal, state and local levels so that all can better understand each other’s 
viewpoint to build trust to create unity. Potential consumers of this thesis would be 
personnel in the DoD Office of the Secretary of Defense Homeland Defense and 
America’s Security Affairs (OSD HD&ASA), USNORTHCOM, the National Guard 
Bureau, the DHS Intergovernmental Affairs, the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, the National Governors Association, the Council of Governors, other state 
governors and local authorities.  
The significance of this research as projected in the hypotheses are addressed and 
confirmed by examining other examples in which unity of effort has been established and 
is benefiting the mission partners and success of the missions at large. The method 
section explains those samples and constructive comparisons. 
E. METHOD 
The research for this thesis is based on current policy initiatives and case studies. 
The intent of analyzing case studies is to show that unity of effort can be accomplished 
and that identifiable means or lessons could be applied and help the unity of effort 
dilemma in the homeland, specifically among the DoD, National Guard and state 
governors. The case study approach helps address the knowledge problem currently 
missing in other research and in the reality of domestic response. The case studies for 
constructive comparison are as follows. 
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• Assess successful unity of effort operations from a local perspective. The 
state of Florida has been recognized for its ability to coordinate first-
responder mission partners for emergency operations. The unity that has 
been created at the state level among partners who normally operate under 
different chains of command may yield recommendations and correlations 
applicable to Title 10 and Title 32 military members who support civil 
authorities. Advantages exist to assessing Florida given that they are also 
operating in the homeland and face similar jurisdictional issues similar to 
federalism that faces Title 10 and Title 32 military.  
• The next case study focuses on unity of effort found in the Israeli Defense 
Force Home Front Command and civil defense operations. The Home 
Front Command focuses on the chain of command under one single 
command structure to maintain unity of effort among the many mission 
partners called upon to support civil defense operations in the State. 
USNORTHCOM and the National Guard currently share a partnership 
with the Israeli Defense Force to learn from their experience in civil 
defense so extending their learning to unity of effort is credible.  
The case studies cover a range of factors including the U.S. local and state 
perspective, a foreign government policy comparison, response to natural disasters and 
response to attacks. These case study samples yields applicable lessons that emphasize 
relationship building and a synchronized unified response structure, which will be helpful 
to the DoD, National Guard and state governors to develop an operational unity of effort 
in the homeland. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Books are not made to be believed, but to be subjected to inquiry. 
– Umberto Eco, The Name of the Rose 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This literature review addresses statutes, directives and policy that attempt to 
indoctrinate unity of effort, as well as scholarly works that try to identify means in which 
the U.S. military, both Title 10 federal forces and Title 32 National Guard, can develop 
unity of effort. Two key events in U.S. history, the attacks on 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina 
dramatically changed the way the United States considers protection of the homeland and 
domestic emergency response. Influential and thought-provoking work by tireless 
stewards in the homeland security enterprise have produced countless initiatives and 
recommendations since these devastating events to enhance how the U.S. military can 
better respond to emergencies, manmade or natural, in the homeland. This literature 
review is an attempt to consolidate those works to characterize the breadth of information 
available that addresses the use of military in domestic response operations, the concept 
of unity of effort and/or the need to implement unity of effort among Title 10 federal 
forces and Title 32 National Guard.  
B. UNITY OF EFFORT AND THE ROLE OF UNITED STATES ARMED 
FORCES ADDRESSED IN STATUTES 
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistant Act, 42 U.S.S. 
5121-5206, gives the President the authority to direct federal capabilities from various 
federal agencies to provide assistance to states in the wake of an emergency or major 
disaster. It is important to highlight what defines an “emergency” or “major disaster” 
according to the Stafford Act: 
‘Emergency’ means any occasion or instance for which, in the 
determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement 
State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property 
and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a 
catastrophe in any part of the United States.  
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‘Major disaster’ means any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, 
tornado, storm, high water, winddriven water, tidal wave, tsunami, 
earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or 
drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part 
of the United States, which in the determination of the President causes 
damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster 
assistance under this Act to supplement the efforts and available resources 
of States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in 
alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby. 
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, June 2007, p. 2) 
When a Stafford Act declaration is made under either one of these defining terms, 
emergency or major disaster, a Presidential declaration follows to formally call on 
resources among federal agencies to respond and support states, some of which may be 
Title 10 military forces (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2008). That being 
said, a nuance with the Stafford Act exists that states that Title 10 military members may 
support a state prior to a declaration being called up. The Immediate Response Authority 
is technically not found in statute but allows local commanders on military installations 
to support civil authorities with the same means that fall under the Stafford Act (Elsea, 
2006). “Joint Publication 3-28, Civil Support, sanctions immediate response 
authority…This policy is limited, restrictive, and conditional” (Center for Army Lessons 
Learned, 2010). Preceding an incident, this immediate authority is based on an 
agreement, whether verbal or formalized in a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), 
between a city or community and a local installation commander.  
The Economy Act, 32 U.S.C 1535-1536, deals with the financial transactions 
involved during emergency response efforts and authorizes a lead federal agency during a 
domestic disaster incident to call upon the DoD for support and goods on a reimbursable 
basis (U.S. Code, 2001). The Economy Act does not discuss unity of effort, per se, but it 
does create the financial framework for agencies to work together and support each other 
in a time of need. Similarly, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 44, Section 206.8, 
instructs the reimbursement process to federal agencies where federal personnel are 
supporting a disaster response. CFR Title 44, Sec 206.8 outlines the types of support and 
expenditures that fall under reimbursement (vLex, 2007).  
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President Ronald Reagan signed Executive Order 12656, Emergency 
Preparedness and Response Responsibilities, in 1988 “to have sufficient capabilities at all 
levels of government to meet essential defense and civilian needs during any national 
security emergency” (Presidential Executive Orders, 1988). The Executive Order 12656 
establishes that various federal agencies, including Defense, Commerce, and Agriculture 
among others, will “respond adequately to all national security emergencies” according to 
requisite responsibilities during a national emergency (Presidential Executive Orders, 
1988). DoD responsibilities include but are not limited to military mobilization and 
support to civilian authorities.  
The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), 18 U.S.C. 1385, stipulates that Title 10 U.S. 
military, Army and Air Force members, are prohibited from performing law enforcement 
functions except when permitted by the Constitution or statute, and if PCA is violated, 
the consequence is punishment by fine or imprisonment. Such law enforcement functions 
under PCA include search, seizure, arrests, apprehension, and interdicting vehicles 
(Elsea, 2006). A caveat statue to PCA is the Military Support for Civilian Law 
Enforcement Agencies, Title 10 U.S.C. 371-382, which gives the U.S. military the 
authority to assist state and local law enforcement agencies by “sharing information and 
expertise; furnishing equipment, supplies, and services; and helping operate equipment” 
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2008). It should be noted that National Guard 
members operating in state authority Title 32 status are exempt from the PCA (RAND 
Corp., 2010). PCA was first enacted in 1878 to protect military members who were being 
put in the uncomfortable position of taking orders from civil authorities who forced them 
to arrest fugitive slaves and take on a politicized role prior to the Civil War (Owens, 
2005). Today, PCA is considered a protection measure for American citizens and their 
civil liberties to ensure Title 10 military members do not inappropriately use force.  
Conversely, the Insurrection Act, 10 U.S.C. 331-335, stipulates that the President 
may employ Title 10 U.S. military into a state to suppress insurrections, rebellions and 
domestic violence, or to enforce state and federal laws. The Insurrection Act is a statute 
that may be used to counter the Posse Comitatus Act where Title 10 military may engage 
in law enforcement functions. Under the Insurrection Act, the National Guard may also 
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be federalized and put into Title 10 status for employment (Elsea, 2006). In addition to 
response missions following Hurricane Katrina, the National Guard were tasked with 
managing the civil unrest occurring in the wake of the disaster; however, the Insurrection 
Act was not invoked to address this issue.  
A specific statute deals with the U.S. military support for hurricane 
reconnaissance. Public Law 102-567, under 15 U.S.C. 15, Section 313, states that the 
Secretary of Commerce and Secretary of Defense develop a “Hurricane Reconnaissance 
Program,” with the purpose of “collecting operational and reconnaissance data, 
conducting research, and analyzing data on tropical cyclones to assist the forecast and 
warning program” (15 USC 313, 2005). While this statute is not specific to unity of 
effort, is does add to the list of authorities currently in place for the U.S. armed forces to 
support civilian authorities and other federal agencies.  
These statutes are imperative to authorize the DoD to support a state or other 
federal agency during a time of need; that being said, none of the above directly 
addresses how unity of effort is related to the authority provided therein. In some ways, 
these statutes either add to the confusion or lead to more uncertainty regarding how Title 
10 and Title 32 military members work together during domestic emergency response 
operations, which further complicates reaching unity of effort. 
C. UNITY OF EFFORT ADDRESSED IN POLICY AND DIRECTIVES 
The National Response Framework provides the overarching policy by the DHS 
that guides the DoD in its support function during domestic emergencies or disasters 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2008). The National Response Framework 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, Management of Domestic Incidents, 
otherwise known as HSPD-5 calls on the Secretary of Defense to:  
provide defense support to civil authorities for domestic incidents as 
directed by the President or when consistent with military readiness, and 
appropriate under the  circumstances and the law. The Secretary of 
Defense shall retain command of military forces providing civil support. 
The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall  
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establish appropriate relationships and mechanisms for cooperation and 
coordination between their two departments. (Department of Homeland 
Security, 2009) 
HSPD-5 has every intent to motivate federal agencies to work together to create a 
seamless “management” for domestic incidents; however, it is difficult to grasp what 
tangible actions must be done within these agencies to reach unity of effort.  
The 2003 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8, National Preparedness, 
focused on the synchronization of planning efforts and was replaced by the Presidential 
Policy Directive or PPD-8, National Preparedness, in March 2011. PPD-8 emphasizes an 
“all-of-nation” approach to emergency response in the homeland by establishing a 
national preparedness goal and system “aimed at strengthening the security and resilience 
of the United States through systematic preparation” (Department of Homeland Security, 
2011). PPD-8 makes special note regarding the use of military forces and states that:  
Nothing in this directive shall limit the authority of the Secretary of 
Defense with regard to the command and control, planning, organization, 
equipment, training, exercises, employment, or other activities of 
Department of Defense forces, or the allocation of Department of Defense 
resources. (Department of Homeland Security, 2011) 
PPD-8 focuses on the lead role of the DHS and directs the Secretary of Homeland 
Security as being responsible for developing the national preparedness goal, as well as 
“coordinating the domestic all-hazards preparedness efforts” for federal, state, local and 
private and nongovernmental partners (Department of Homeland Security, 2011). While 
PPD-8 certainly sets new guidelines and objectives for the DHS to develop an “all-of-
nation” approach in which state, local and federal entities are working together, no 
mandate exists to require such actions in achieving a national preparedness goal.  
In 2007, the Department of Defense Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint 
Operating Concept (JOC) was created to address “a complex and uncertain global 
security environment characterized by a combination of persistent and emerging threats 
to the Homeland” (Department of Defense, 2007, p. ii). The Secretary of Defense, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Commander of USNORTHCOM signed and approved 
the JOC to set guidelines that would support new and forthcoming requirements from the 
 18
DoD for a DSCA mission. Section 4.b. of the JOC concentrates on unity of effort and 
addresses four “seams of uncertainty” in which the DoD would use strategic principles to 
produce effective domestic operations. The principles as outlined in the JOC are agility, 
decisiveness and integration. While the explanation and direction under these principles 
is valuable and prescriptive, the realistic means for executing these principles to close the 
gaps and seams of uncertainty might still be questioned. Meaning, words and definitions 
can be effective in as much as they are implemented.  
Similarly, DoD Directive 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA), 
codifies the support function of the U.S. military for domestic emergencies, “by which 
DoD components will plan for and respond to requests from civil government agencies in 
times of major disasters or emergencies” (Buchalter, 2007). It is worth mentioning that 
additional directives provide DoD guidelines that fall under MSCA support missions. 
DoD Directive 3025.12 deals with “Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances” 
(Department of Defense, 1994). In addition, DoD Directive 3025.15 further outlines the 
“Military Assistance to Civilian Authorities” role that may fall outside the scope of an 
emergency in Directive 3025.1 (Department of Defense, 1997). Lastly, the DoD 
Directive 5525.5 outlines the responsibilities of the DoD in “Cooperation with Civilian 
Law Enforcement Officials” (Department of Defense, 1989).  
The MSCA or most often referred to as the DSCA mission is led by 
USNORTHCOM for all federal military response efforts in a domestic incident. 
USNORTHCOM defines the missions of supporting civil authorities as “domestic 
disaster relief operations that occur during fires, hurricanes, floods and earthquakes… 
counter-drug operations and managing the consequences of a terrorist event employing a 
weapon of mass destruction” (U.S. Northern Command, 2010). For each of the mission 
areas, either instructions or directives on the role and responsibility of Department of 
Defense personnel exist.1 For example, for fire support , DoD Instruction 6055.06 
outlines the supporting role and guidelines under the Fire and Emergency Services 
Program (Department of Defense, 2006). Moreover, for counterdrug operations, the 
                                                 
1 Of note, in accordance with the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves recommendation, 
the DoD is currently updating DoD directives related to MSCA and DSCA. 
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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction on “DoD Counterdrug Support” 
provides clear guidance for USNORTHCOM when conducting support operations for 
U.S. law enforcement agencies (Department of Defense, 2008). USNORTHCOM DSCA 
support missions can range in size and capability, from the 2004 ricin contamination 
incident in the Senate Dirksen Office Building, to providing Navy search and salvage 
divers to the 2007 Minnesota bridge collapse, to Hurricane Gustav pre and post landfall 
recovery missions in 2008 (U.S. Northern Command, 2010). The March 2004 Directive 
for Strategic Planning outlined by the DoD included the Strategy for Homeland Defense 
and Civil Support, which focuses on four areas for homeland defense: emphasize respect 
for America’s constitutional principles; adherence to Presidential and Secretary of 
Defense guidance; recognition of terrorist and state-based threats to the United States; 
and commitment to the continued transformation of U.S. military capabilities 
(Department of Defense, 2005).  
Although necessary for giving direction and guidance, the internal DoD directives 
and policy documents do not explain how the DoD can effectively develop unity of effort 
with its homeland security partners.2 Much of the current information and guidance is 
directly related to the concept of unity of effort but the emphasis is lacking and may not 
be intuitive. Meaning, unless an individual is fairly familiar with the policy and directive 
numbers, it would be difficult to find, understand and then apply these guiding principles 
to unity of effort. The “how” factor is missing among these documents and further 
knowledge and understanding must be acquired among DoD heads in consultation with 
homeland security stakeholders to strike a balance on unity of effort.  
D. UNITY OF EFFORT ADDRESSED IN ACADEMIC LITERATURE 
The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) partnered with the former 
commissioners of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve (CNGR) to 
propose solutions on the future use of the National Guard and Reserves in “An 
Indispensable Force: Investing in America’s National Guard and Reserves” (Nagl & 
                                                 
2 Recent developments in the DoD to address guidance on unity of effort in consultation with other 
homeland security stakeholders at the state and federal levels is addressed in Chapter III. 
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Sharp, 2010). The report acknowledges that because the “American public holds a zero 
tolerance attitude toward delayed or mismanaged disaster response by the federal 
government,” the U.S. government should “urgently” take various actions to “protect the 
homeland” (Nagl & Sharp, 2010, p. 19). One of the key objectives is the “contentious 
issue of command and control” between the DoD and the National Guard as it relates to 
achieving unity of effort. The report specifically describes the obstacle as one grounded 
in “jurisdictional debates and bureaucratic turf battles” (Nagl & Sharp, 2010, p. 19). 
Although the report offers recommendations and pointedly addresses the difficulty of 
striking a balance between state and federal equities, it is unknown whether the means 
prescribed to solve the “debates and battles” will be adopted so that unity of effort may 
be reached. Much like the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve, this follow-
on CNAS report may make waves within the DoD for action but only time will tell.  
In “Managing the Next Domestic Catastrophe: Ready (or Not?),” Wormuth and 
Witowsky acknowledge the NRF and the vast number of documents, directives and 
efforts that have been made since 9/11 by multiple organizations, at state and federal 
levels, to define and develop a national approach to domestic emergency response (2008, 
p. VI). In addition, like many other reports, their recommendations for unity of effort, 
although valid, have either not been acted upon or if acted upon have not solved the 
problem of unity of effort in the homeland. In concurrence with Wormuth and Witowsky, 
the above mentioned statutes, policy and directives offer written guidance regarding the 
federal military role and mission to support civil authorities in a domestic emergency; 
however, uncertainty and debate over the use and command and control of federal 
military forces within a state remain unresolved because unity of effort among mission 
partners has not been reached. In the same vein as Wormuth and Witowsky’s work, 
“Threats at Our Threshold,” compiled thought-provoking pieces by the leading homeland 
security experts in the United States from the First Annual Homeland Defense and 
Homeland Security Conference in 2007 (U.S. Army War College, 2008). “Threats at Our 
Threshold” addresses unity of effort, the use of military in the homeland and reforming 
policy all the same but it is difficult to assess what concrete actions have been taken  
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because of this academic insight. Thus, the question remains, what will it take for the 
DoD, USNORTHCOM, the National Guard and state governors to reach a consensus on 
unity of effort?  
In the Gilmore Commission’s Fifth Annual Report to the President and Congress, 
“V. Forging America’s New Normalcy: Securing Our Homeland, Preserving our 
Liberty,” one of the key guiding actions is to define clearly the “roles, responsibilities and 
the acceptable use of military domestically that strengthens the National Guard and 
Federal Reserve Components for any domestic mission” (The Advisory Panel to Assess 
Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
2003). The Gilmore Commission identified a clear requirement for additional information 
on the delineation of responsibilities for the military during domestic incident response 
efforts not currently recognized in policy and statute. While the Gilmore Commission 
provides constructive recommendations, the identification of the need alone does not 
resolve the problem. As many reports conducted either by think tanks, the GAO or 
various commissions and advisory panels, recommendations do not necessarily lead to 
actions with positive results.  
Some people believe legislation must be enacted to create unity of effort among 
homeland security stakeholders. Birmingham, Brandt and Salo (2003) recommended that 
Congress create legislation, “given the challenges facing the interagency process, there 
needs to be legislation providing a clear blueprint mandating continuous transformation 
toward integration of interagency capabilities” (Birmingham, Brandt, & Salo, 2003, p. 
15). Similar to the overhaul of Goldwater-Nichols, Birmingham, Brandt and Salo believe 
that the interagency requires Congressional intervention to mandate that organizations 
work together to achieve unity of effort. In addition to the legislation, they recommend a 
new organization be created to address the interagency process, the National Interagency 
Organization. While parallels can be drawn to Goldwater-Nichols and the necessity to 
reshape how organizations work together, the recommendation for a Congressional 
mandate is a solution that does meet considerable opposition among stakeholders and 
does not consider states as part of the interagency. It is commonly said that domestic 
emergencies begin as local emergencies so part of the quandary with unity of effort is 
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developing a way in which the local and state perspective can be incorporated into the 
interagency to achieve unity of effort. Congressional mandates do not impact all 
homeland security stakeholders at the state level, which may only lead to consternation 
among the federal partners.  
A school of thought exists that amending current statutes or directives may help 
Title 10 and Title 32 military members deal with state sovereignty issues to synchronize 
military assets better for domestic emergency response. Liberato found that various DoD 
policies and directives must be amended to address new defense support to civil 
authorities (DSCA) challenges. Liberato recommended creating a new structure or 
framework of Title 10, Reserve and National Guard military members as a Civil Support 
Expeditionary Force (CSEF) to address these issues. He argues that one benefit of a 
CSEF is the geographical or regional dispersal of forces to respond to incidents better in a 
timely manner (Liberato, 2007). The merits of a regional force were recognized by the 
DoD with the establishment of the Homeland Response Force (HRF) in each Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) region, which is currently being implemented 
(Garamone, 2010). It is worth noting, however, that prior to the HRF, the DoD had 
created two out of three Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Explosive (CBRNE) 
Consequence Management Force (CCMRF) structures, which were a mix of Title 32 and 
Title 10, active and reserve forces, that were regionalized but not specifically defined by 
the 10 FEMA regions. The CCMRF structure was very much in keeping with Liberato’s 
suggested construct as a means to develop unity of effort because of the Title 32 and Title 
10 mix. Due to various reasons assessed during the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, 
the DoD decided to convert the CCMRF structure into the new HRF construct comprised 
of only Title 32 National Guardsmen. A Title 10 Active Duty force called the Defense 
CBRN Response Force (DCRF) exists to augment the Title 32 HRF forces but they are 
separate forces entirely. This new construct for regional dispersion and allocation of the 
National Guard to the mission followed a recommendation made in the 2010 Quadrennial 
Defense Review (Garamone, 2010). Although Liberato’s recommendation for a regional 
force has come to fruition, the opportunity to develop unity of effort through a mix of 
Title 10 and Title 32 military members in this construct is yet to be determined. 
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Wessman also recommends creating a new structure or framework of personnel to 
develop unity of effort (Wessman, 2007). In 2007, Wessman found that interagency 
coordination had improved since Hurricane Katrina but that issues remained and a new 
construct to bring homeland security stakeholders together was needed. He based the new 
construct on that of Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S), which is under the 
command of U.S. Southern Command and synchronizes multiple federal components 
within the command and control structure. Wessman believed that by physically 
combining multiple organizations that have equities in domestic emergency response that 
unity of effort would eventually be reached. Some people may agree that Wessman’s 
concept of replicating the successful organization of JIATF-S for homeland security 
purposes is sound; however, USNORTHCOM has already implemented a similar 
interagency coordination construct. Over 40 representatives in USNORTHCOM 
represent more than 60 agencies in domestic emergency response, ranging from the Red 
Cross to FEMA. Each representative is part of the USNORTHCOM Joint Interagency 
Coordination Group (JIACG), a stand-alone directorate within the command. Also, over 
40 National Guardsmen are full time at USNORTHCOM, including senior positions 
within the command, such as the Deputy Commander of USNORTHCOM (NORAD & 
USNORTHCOM, 2011). While this interagency and National Guard representation has 
improved overall coordination and communication, state sovereignty and federalism are 
factors that JIATF-S does not face as frequently in its area of operations. Wessman 
appropriately points out that the USNORTHCOM JIACG is not a deployable force for 
emergency response, however, Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) is a subordinate 
command of USNORTHOM and has a deployable element led by a 2-star National 
Guard officer with a mix of Title 10 and Title 32 military personnel. With the integration 
of federal agency representatives and National Guard into USNORTHCOM, the 
command has as many if not more interagency partners than JIATF-S. Thus, replicating 
the JIATF-S model as Wessman posits may be overcome by efforts made by the 
command.  
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Similar to developing a new organization structure, Burkett assessed that 
implementing a dual-status command and control structure would help lead to increased 
unity of effort in domestic emergency response efforts (Burkett, 2008). Burkett provides 
the requisite background on the four kinds of command and control structures currently 
available in the homeland depending on the incident; state command, parallel command, 
dual-status command, and federal command. Burkett recommends that dual-status 
command “addresses the unity of effort dilemma directly” because Title 32 National 
Guard and Title 10 military personnel would report to one commander under one, unified 
command structure (Burkett, 2008, p. 134). While many advantages exist to the dual-
status structure that appease both state and federal equities, one might gather that the 
certification process and gubernatorial approval from every state governor that Burkett 
proposes will take a considerable amount of time and will be challenging to achieve in 
and of itself. Burkett acknowledges that this process may take some time but does not 
suggest an idea on how the process could be expedited. That being said, in 2008, Burkett 
was unaware that Congress and the President would create a “Council of Governors” that 
would address dual-status command in partnership with the National Guard Bureau, DHS 
and the DoD. To Burkett’s credit, progress has been made among these equities on this 
command and control structure; however, much remains to be done to operationalize and 
test the dual-status command structure in a real-world event. In addition, Burkett 
acknowledges state sovereignty and federalism but does not discuss how other partners in 
the debate, such as members of Congress and lobbying associations, contribute to the 
command and control dialogue.  
Church suggests that interdisciplinary education can resolve the issue of creating 
unity of effort among homeland security professionals. Church makes a good argument 
for increased emphasis on education; however, she does not address how the political 
discourse and command and control concerns fit into the interdisciplinary education 
method (Church, 2010). Similarly, Norris also suggests using education, specifically 
Professional Military Education (PME) courses, as an end-road to tackle the command 
and control, unity of command and unity of effort issues between Title 32 and Title 10 
military. While Norris does an excellent job of framing the conflicting perspectives on 
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these issues, room exists for further research on how to include the political, federal and 
the state paradox at play that impacts the overall process of attaining unity of effort 
(Norris, 2008).  
Some people believe that a better training and exercise program will create more 
unity of effort between Title 32 and Title 10 military members. Austin aptly summarizes 
the DSCA mission as it was executed during Hurricane Katrina and recommends, 
“USNORTHCOM must ensure the integration of both Active duty, National Guard and 
Reserve components capabilities into pre-event exercises and on scene operational 
planning for catastrophic events” (Austin, 2007). USNORTHCOM Training and Exercise 
Program currently incorporates many National Guard from states who participate in 
exercises each year, including Ardent Sentry and Vibrant Response (Anderson, 2011). 
Although relationships are fostered by training and exercise opportunities between Title 
10 and Title 32, a sustained and operational unity of effort has yet to be accomplished 
and implemented beyond the training and exercise environment.  
E. SUMMARY 
The statutes, policy and directives that authorize and outline the role of federal 
U.S. Armed Forces in the homeland do not adequately incorporate how to operationalize 
the concept of unity of effort. By their very nature, they provide the conditions to the 
domestic use of the military and the concept of unity of effort; however, they do not 
prescribe methods on reaching unity of effort while following these authorizing and 
guiding principles. The scholarly and academic literature offers recommendations on 
unity of effort, and although abundant, the literature does not fully address the execution 
phase or “how” unity can be accomplished. Recommendations, no matter how insightful 
and true, do not produce positive outcomes unless an effort to act upon them exists. The 
politics at play and competing interests of federal and state sovereignty is acknowledged 
in some of the literature; however, this factor is significant to acting upon 
recommendations to create unity of effort. A clear knowledge problem still exists, not 
only among homeland security stakeholders, but within the organizations that support  
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defense support to civil authorities’ response efforts as well. Further research must be 
conducted to consolidate the varying schools of thought regarding unity of effort to 
address this knowledge problem. 
Chapter III will concentrate on the history of the debate on unity of effort and 
command and control. The research conducted and information provided in this thesis 
has not been documented previously primarily because events are still unfolding as the 
research is being conducted. Thus, the knowledge gap currently at hand is addressed by 
offering the reader a range of views from various sources and organizations that have 
been engaged on this subject. The confounded history of building unity of effort among 
Title 32 and Title 10 military members is a core reason as to why it has not been reached; 
thus, the history and perspectives are vital to appreciating the intricacies of the issue fully 
to move forward.  
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III. THE STATE OF PLAY ON UNITY OF EFFORT 
The conduct of war resembles the workings of an intricate machine with 
tremendous friction, so that combinations which are easily planned on 
paper can be executed only with great effort. 
– Carl von Clausewitz 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past several years, the concept of unity of effort has received an 
increasing amount of attention among senior officials from the DoD, USNORTHCOM, 
the National Guard, state governors and Congress, among others. Many reasons exist 
why unity of effort has received more attention but the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina 
was the catalyst and reminded Americans that synchronization among mission partners, 
specifically U.S. military forces, is essential to ensure successful response operations 
when tragedy strikes. One contributing factor to writing this thesis is the opportunity to 
provide substantive information about developments to create unity of effort and the 
advances that have been made toward the current state of affairs among said mission 
partners. The following background information and historical summation is meant to 
inform the reader of multiple perspectives from various mission partners who have 
contributed greatly to the dialogue on how to create unity of effort for the U.S. military in 
the homeland. Understanding and appreciating the history of this issue is critical for 
mission partners to move forward in a positive and constructive manner.  
B. BACKGROUND ON THE MILITARY COMPONENTS: ACTIVE AND 
RESERVE 
First, it is important to separate the manpower for each component. The active 
component of the armed forces consists of the following: 566,045 in the Army; 328,303 
in the Navy; 202,441 in the Marine Corp; and 334,196 in the Air Force (Stanley, 2011). 
The reserve component of the United States Armed Forces consists of both National 
Guard and federal reserve personnel, and according to the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense for Reserve Affairs, the Ready Reserve manpower total consists of 1.1 million 
members (Stanley, 2011). Of the total 1.1 million members in the Ready Reserve, there 
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are 363,995 Army National Guard; 106,643 Air Force National Guard; 205,849 U.S. 
Army Reserve; 64,677 U.S. Navy Reserve, 39,949 Marine Corps Reserve and 70,359 
U.S. Air Force Reserve personnel living in communities around the United States 
(Stanley, 2011).  
It is also important to distinguish the difference in authorities related to command 
and control among Title 32 National Guard, Title 10 Active Duty and Title 10 federal 
reserve forces. National Guardsmen, under Title 32 of U.S. Code, serve at the request of a 
state governor and may respond to an incident or disaster in active duty or state active 
duty if called upon (U.S. Code Title 32). In contrast, the active duty and federal reserve 
forces serve under the authority of the President and the Secretary of Defense (U.S. Code 
Title 10). Although federal reserve units reside within any given state, these forces are 
not under the control of a governor; rather, as federal military members, the President has 
command and control authority. 
To provide more context regarding command and control of forces in the 
homeland, the following figure represents when a governor and the President may be in 
command and control of the National Guard in Title 32 status and federal forces in Title 
10 status. 
 
Figure 1.   Command and control of military (From: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 
2010) 
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In the end, federalism is a cornerstone of the U.S. government with exclusive and shared 
responsibilities at the national and state levels. Federalism and state sovereignty then 
dictates how military members, both federal and state, are commanded in the homeland 
and by whom.  
C. CONCERNS AND DEBATE THAT HAVE IMPACTED DIALOGUE ON 
UNITY OF EFFORT 
Relevant history has impacted how Title 10 and Title 32 military members 
coordinate and communicate both before and during domestic emergency operations. 
Admiral James Winnefeld, Commander of U.S. Northern Command, appropriately stated 
during his April 2011 hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, “there has 
been some historical friction between the State governments and the Federal Government 
regarding command and control of military forces inside a State in the wake of a disaster” 
(Senate Armed Services Committee, April 5, 2011, p. 9). As previously stated, Hurricane 
Katrina was a catalyst to much of the recent history and tension to create unity of effort. 
It has been said that following Hurricane Katrina, the Bush Administration felt 
that the federal government needed access to National Guard to better respond to 
disasters in the homeland. President Bush wanted to federalize Louisiana National Guard 
in the days after Hurricane Katrina and former Governor Kathleen Blanco “refused to 
relinquish command” (Peterson, 2007). It is understood among some circles that the DoD 
pressed for a proposal to change the Insurrection Act to federalize the National Guard; 
however, this does not seem to be the intention of the proposal or the DoD. The Bush 
Administration, through the DoD, submitted a proposal to Congress with the intention to 
clarify the conditions of when the President can invoke the Insurrection Act to include a 
response to natural disasters or terrorist attacks. The House Armed Services Committee 
included the proposal in their version of the FY07 National Defense Authorization Act 
but unfortunately, the DoD proposal neglected to exclude National Guard from the 
request to access reserve forces in response to disasters. In May 2006, it has been said 
that the Senate Armed Service Committee Report accompanying S. 2766 for the FY07 
National Defense Authorization Act attempted to rectify the mischaracterization by 
stating “the committee recommends a provision that would amend chapter 15 of title 10, 
 30
United States Code, the so-called `Insurrection Act,' to clarify and update the statute” 
(Senate Armed Services Committee, 2006). The Committee Report references Hurricane 
Katrina specifically as rationale to amending the conditions of the Insurrection Act and 
states “the antique terminology and the lack of explicit reference to such situations as 
natural disasters or terrorist attacks may have contributed to a reluctance to use the armed 
forces in situations such as Hurricane Katrina” (Senate Armed Services Committee, 
2006). In June 2006, several state governors raised this notion of federal control over 
National Guardsmen on Capitol Hill and voiced their concern about such access to state 
guard forces (Peterson, 2006). Many felt that governors had essentially been cut out of 
the legislative process and should have been consulted by the DoD before the proposal 
was sent to the Capitol Hill. Before the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve, 
former Governor Ruth Ann Minner spoke on behalf of the National Governors 
Association and said, “we have serious concerns over the repeated lack of consultation 
between the Department of Defense and the governors” (Peterson, 2006). In the end, 
Congress amended section 331 of Title 10, U.S. Code of the Insurrection Act in the John 
Warner National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 
109-364). The amendment to the Insurrection Act added incidents including “natural 
disaster, epidemic, or other serious public health emergency, terrorist attack or incident” 
as conditions under which the President may employ military “including the National 
Guard to Federal Service” if he determines that “authorities of the state or possession are 
incapable of maintaining public order” (10 U.S.C. §§ 331-335).  
It is fair to say that state governors and the National Guard community did not 
agree with the amendment to the Insurrection Act and the situation was characterized by 
Brig Gen (Ret) Richard Green of the National Guard Association of the United States 
(NGAUS), “these events represent a continued lack of coordination among Pentagon 
officials, the Guard and governors” (Green, 2006). The Senate National Guard Caucus 
co-chairs, Senator Leahy from Vermont and Senator Bond from Missouri, held a news 
conference following the conference report of the FY07 National Defense Authorization 
Act (NDAA) to protest the decisions made in the bill. In a prepared statement, they 
shared their concern that the changes to the Insurrection Act would be “a sizable step 
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toward weakening states’ authority over their Guard units” (National Guard Association 
of the United States, 2006). The National Governors Association and the National Guard 
Community, including NGAUS and the Adjutants General Association of the United 
States or AGAUS, sought support from Congress and the Senate National Guard Caucus 
to repeal the amendment. 
The next year, Senators Leahy and Bond introduced legislation to repeal the 
amendment made to the Insurrection Act. They were successful and Section 1068 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) returned 
the Insurrection Act to its previous language. Although the changes to the Insurrection 
Act had been repealed, bridges were seriously burned between state governors along with 
the National Guard and the DoD. From this point forward, governors and the National 
Guard community were skeptical about the intentions of the DoD regarding the use and 
command and control of military, active or reserve, in the homeland.  
D. COMPETING INTERESTS AND LEGISLATION REGARDING 
COMMAND AND CONTROL OF MILITARY FORCES IN THE 
HOMELAND 
Parallel and competing efforts to introduce legislation regarding command and 
control of military members for disaster and emergency response in the homeland have 
occurred. On one side, members of Congress from both the House and Senate, have co-
sponsored and introduced versions of a “National Guard Empowerment Act” for several 
years. One section of the act would mandate governors have tactical control or TACON 
over Title 10, active and reserve, military members operating in their respective states. In 
addition, on the other side, the DoD has pursued changes to Title 10, Section 12304 of 
U.S. Code to give the Secretary of Defense the authority to involuntarily call up Title 10 
federal reserve military members to respond to disasters and emergencies in the 
homeland. Although, these are seemingly separate and distinct actions, these legislative 
positions have been fundamentally at odds and have been the core issues preventing these 
mission partners from reaching a compromise on unity of effort. Admiral James 
Winnefeld characterized the command and control dynamic during testimony before the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, “understandably, the State governors would like to 
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have control because they are sovereign States; and also understandably, the Federal 
Government believes it has a vested interest in Federal forces being used legally, 
ethically, safely, and cost- effectively” (Senate Armed Services Committee, April 5, 
2011, p. 9). Ultimately, it is difficult to create unity when the parties involved are 
pursuing legislation counter to the other’s position, which hinders a compromise on a 
way forward. This chapter discusses each of these positions and legislation in more 
detail. 
1. Tactical Control of Federal Forces  
The National Guard, National Governors Association, the U.S. House National 
Guard and Reserve Caucus and the U.S. Senate National Guard Caucus have been in 
mutual agreement that governors should have tactical control over Title 10 federal 
military forces for domestic emergencies or disasters within a state. In 2008, Senator 
Patrick Leahy and Senator Christopher “Kit” Bond, the co-chairs of the U.S. Senate 
National Guard Caucus, co-sponsored the “National Guard Empowerment Act and State-
National Defense Integration Act.” Among the provisions in the bill, Section 7 pertained 
to “state control of federal military forces engaged in activities within the states and 
possessions” (Department of Defense, April 11, 2008). Senator Leahy and Senator Bond 
issued a “dear colleague” letter to fellow senators to garner support and co-sponsorship 
for the bill to be included in the Fiscal Year 2009 National Defense Authorization Act 
which stated, “the legislation ensures that the Nation’s Governors maintain tactical 
control over military forces, including active duty troops, operating in their home state 
during emergencies” (Bond & Leahy, 2008). The National Governors Association 
submitted letters of appreciation to the U.S. House National Guard and Reserve Caucus 
and the U.S. Senate National Guard Caucus for introducing the National Guard 
Empowerment Act with a provision on tactical control for governors and for their 
continued support to enact the provision (National Governors Association, 2008). The 
following year in 2009, the U.S. Senate Guard Caucus reintroduced the “National Guard 
Empowerment and State-National Defense Integration Act,” which again included a 
provision on tactical control for state governors over federal forces.  
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The DoD has strongly opposed this provision on tactical control over federal 
military forces in the National Guard Empowerment Acts. In letters sent to the Senate 
Armed Services Committee and House Armed Services Committee in April 2008, the 
DoD expressed the following: 
Section 7 of S.2760 would require the Secretary of Defense to place 
Federal forces under the tactical control of the Governor of a State when 
responding to an emergency within the State. This is a constitutional issue 
and as such, the President’s senior advisors would recommend that the 
President veto any bill sent to him that included this provision. Article II, 
Section 2 of the Constitution specifies that “The President shall be the 
Command in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United State, and of the 
Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the 
United States.” This section in effect would mandate that the President 
relinquish his command and control authority of the Armed Forces to a 
State official, which is contrary to the principles of the Federal system of 
government and the authority vested in the President. (Department of 
Defense, April 11, 2008) 
The DoD has not wavered from this position. In essence, the DoD feels that giving a state 
governor tactical control of Title 10 active duty military infringes on the power and 
authority of the President. This issue of who has command and control over military 
forces was the same concern state governors had when the Insurrection Act was amended 
in the FY07 NDAA as it relates to Title 32 National Guard. Both sides, state and federal, 
do not want to relinquish authority over their respective forces and both have made those 
positions clear. Yet, a power struggle ensued as legislative agendas for increased 
authorities developed.  
2. Call Up of Federal Reserve Forces 
The DoD has pursued amending Title 10, Section 12304 of U.S. Code for several 
years by submitting a legislative proposal to Congress with the intent to gain the authority 
to involuntary mobilize over 400,000 Title 10 federal reserve forces in response to a 
disaster or emergency in the homeland. Although Section 12304 of Title 10 U.S. Code 
permits the Reserve Component of the Armed Forces to respond to certain emergencies, 
the definition of a “certain emergency” pertains only to incidents when the United States 
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is attacked or if there is threat of an attack.3 Unfortunately, some emergencies, such as 
natural disasters, fall outside the scope of this definition and can result in a significant 
loss of life or property where access to Title 10 federal reserve forces could provide 
additional support from the DoD. 
The OSD HD&ASA has led the effort to draft, coordinate, submit, track and 
communicate the merits of the legislative proposal to Congress. Regarding the approval 
process to submit a proposal to Congress, it should be noted that the Office of Legislative 
Counsel in the DoD coordinates every legislative proposal with the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), which “ensures that proposal legislation is acceptable 
to Federal Departments and Agencies in the Executive Branch and that it embodies the 
Administration’s Policy objectives” (Office of Legislative Counsel for the Department of 
Defense, 2010). The DoD submitted legislative proposals for Call Up of the Federal 
Reserve with approval and clearance by OMB in FY08, FY09, FY10 and FY11. By 
virtue of clearance from the Office of Management and Budget, this change to Title 10, 
Section 12304 has been supported by both the Bush Administration and Obama 
Administration (Department of Defense, 2010). Indeed, other government organizations 
have recommended amending Section 12304 as well.  
Revising Title 10, Section 12304 to expand access to the armed forces in the 
federal reserve in the wake of a disaster has either been explicitly recommended or 
implicitly encouraged by multiple arms of government and executives who serve in 
government. Following Hurricane Andrew in 1993, the GAO conducted an investigation 
and issued a report entitled, “Disaster Assistance: DoD’s Support for Hurricanes Andrew 
and Iniki and Typhoon Omar” (Government Accountability Office, 1993). Among the 
core findings in the report to Congress, the GAO documented a “need to increase the role 
of the reserves in disaster assistance operations” (Government Accountability Office, 
1993, p. 25). Within the explanation of this finding, the GAO stated, “the reserves could 
take on a larger role in disaster relief because much of DoD’s combat support and combat 
                                                 
3 “Certain emergencies” are defined as, “(1) a use or threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction; 
or (2) a terrorist attack or threatened terrorist attack in the United States that results, or could result in 
significant loss of life or property”(10 USC 12304).  
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service-support capabilities is in the reserve components—particularly the Army 
Reserves—and it is this type of capability that is needed during disasters” (Government 
Accountability Office, 1993, p. 25). The GAO provided a specific example where a 
reserve unit could not support efforts during and after Hurricane Andrew. The GAO 
stated, “U.S. Army Forces Command wanted to activate the 841st Engineer Battalion—
an Army Reserve unit located in Miami…However, because of legal requirements, the 
unit could not be ordered to active duty to provide disaster assistance” (Government 
Accountability Office, 1993, p. 26). 
Similarly, the GAO conducted an investigation and review of operations after 
Hurricane Katrina in a report entitled, “Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises 
Needed to Guide the Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters” 
(Government Accountability Office, 2006). According to the GAO:  
A key mobilization statute also affected the integration of the military 
response. Title 10 of the United States Code currently limits a unit or 
member of a reserve component from being involuntarily ordered to 
federal active duty for disaster response...As a result, all the Reservists 
who responded to Hurricane Katrina were volunteers. The process of 
lining up volunteers can be time consuming and is more appropriate for 
mobilizing individuals than it is for mobilizing entire units or capabilities 
that may be needed during a catastrophe. (Government Accountability 
Office, 2006, pp. 6, 27) 
Indeed, the only issue documented in the section “Matter for Congressional 
Consideration” of the 2006 GAO Report concerned amending Title 10, Section 12304. 
The GAO stated:  
In view of the significant military downsizing that has occurred since we 
first raised this matter [referring to the 1993 GAO Report on Hurricane 
Andrew] and the need to actively engage the total force in order to meet 
missions at home and abroad, we continue to believe that the Congress 
should consider lifting or modifying the mobilization restriction—10 
U.S.C. 12304 (c)(1)—that limits reserve component participation in 
catastrophic disasters. (Government Accountability Office, 2006, p. 36) 
In 2008, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve (CNGR) issued a 
Final Report of Recommendations to the DoD and to Congress on how to improve the 
role of and support to the Reserve Component of the United States Armed Forces. “The 
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Commission believed that current mobilization authorities for federal reserve forces to 
respond to emergencies are insufficient and should be expanded” (Commission on the 
National Guard and Reserve, 2008, p. 112). The Commission on the National Guard and 
Reserve (CNGR) noted that the current authorities to access the Coast Guard could 
provide a good model for access to federal reserve forces and recommended that 
“Congress should amend the mobilization statutes to provide service Secretaries the 
authority to involuntarily mobilize federal reserve components for up to 60 days in a 
four-month period and up to 120 days in a two-year period during or in response to 
imminent natural or man-made disasters” (Commission on the National Guard and 
Reserve, 2008, p. 112). The U.S. Coast Guard may be called up involuntarily to respond 
to natural disasters under Title 14 of U.S. Code. This authority was utilized following the 
January 12, 2010 earthquake disaster in Haiti when Secretary Napolitano authorized up to 
900 reserve U.S. Coast Guard in support of the U.S. government’s response to the 
devastation. In a DHS press release, Secretary Napolitano stated, “activating our reserve 
Coast Guard forces will expand our capacity to assist in aid efforts in Haiti” (Department 
of Homeland Security, 2010).  
The Chairman of Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Carl Levin, 
expressed his support during an exchange with Admiral James Winnefeld, Commander of 
USNORTHCOM, during an April 2011 committee hearing. Regarding the proposal for 
involuntary mobilization of Title 10 federal reserve forces, Senator Levin stated, “well, I 
would hope you would pursue that course, because it just doesn’t seem sensible to me not 
to have that capability…it can make a real difference in response to a disaster” (Senate 
Armed Services Committee, April 5, 2011, p. 9).  
Although amending Title 10, Section 12304 to access federal reserve forces 
following a disaster or emergency has been widely encouraged or recommended to 
Congress by the GAO, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve, the OMB, 
the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration, and the Chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee in addition to DoD officials and USNORTHCOM Combatant 
Commanders, uncertainties and concerns remain about the command and control of these 
forces. For the past several years, Congress has been reluctant to act and include the DoD 
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legislative proposal in the National Defense Authorization Act because of opposition 
raised by members of Congress, the National Guard, the National Governors Association 
and state governors.  
E. HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF CONCERNS AND DEBATE ON THESE 
LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES 
Many among the National Guard and state governors have been concerned that 
accessing Title 10 federal reserve forces may carry over to command and control of Title 
32 National Guard within any given state. Indeed, distrust and skepticism drove 
opposition to the proposal to amend Title 10, Section 12304 given previous changes 
made to the Insurrection Act in the FY07 National Defense Authorization Act. Other 
reasons may exist, of course, but this notion has been shared publicly by governors and 
National Guardsmen and is detailed later in this section. It should be noted that many in 
the National Guard community and state governors acknowledged that although this 
authority does not apply to Title 32 National Guardsmen, they still oppose the proposal. 
In a letter to Senator John McCain of Arizona in 2008, the President of the Adjutants 
General Association of the United States, Major General Frank Vavala stated: 
The Adjutants General Association of the United States (AGAUS) 
strongly opposes provisions of the House passed National Defense 
Authorization Act of 2009. Particularly Sections 591 and Section 594 that 
amends the Insurrection Act by expanding the authority of the President to 
order federal military reserve components (Army Reserve, Marine 
Reserve, Coast Guard Reserve, Air Force Reserve) other than the National 
Guard to Title 10 duty for domestic missions, including natural disasters 
and emergencies for which states qualify for federal funding under the 
Robert T. Stafford Act. AGAUS has concluded that these provisions are 
unwarranted and unneeded. (AGAUS, July 17, 2008) 
The Commander of USNORTHCOM, General Gene Renuart and the Undersecretary for 
Personnel and Readiness, David Chu, submitted letters to the Senate and House National 
Guard and Reserve Caucus’ to offer support and express that the proposal was only 
focused on access to Title 10 federal reserve forces and not the National Guard (Chu, 
2008). In response to the growing opposition and concern, the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, Dr. Paul Stockton, wrote 
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a letter to every state governor in July 2009 to quell alarm and clarify why the DoD was 
seeking authority to access Title 10 federal reserve forces for disaster response in the 
homeland. Governor James Douglas of Vermont replied to Dr. Stockton’s letter and 
wrote: 
The proposal you suggest may have merit, but its consideration must be 
preceded by a discussion regarding the tactical control of forces serving 
inside a state in response to a  disaster or emergency…We are concerned 
that the legislative proposal you discuss in your letter would invite 
confusion on critical command and control issues, complicate interagency 
planning, establish stove-piped response efforts, and interfere with 
governors’ constitutional responsibilities to ensure the safety and security 
of their citizens. (National Governors Association, 2009) 
To address any possible change in Title 10 Section 12304 to access federal reserve 
forces, the National Governors Association voiced their desire for tactical control of Title 
10 military forces to eventually consider this legislative change to Title 10 Section 12304. 
According to policy set by the National Governor’s Association in 2009 and again in 
2011: 
Unless or until governors are given tactical control over Title 10 active 
duty and reserve military forces engaged in domestic operations within 
their state or territory, or the use of Dual Status Command authorities are 
expanded to encompass no-notice events, governors support the 
congressional rejection of provisions to change the Insurrection Act to 
allow the President to call-up and domestically deploy federal reservists 
during the response to a domestic event. (National Governors Association, 
2011) 
While this policy by the National Governors Association highlights the governors’ 
rejection of changes to the Insurrection Act, the proposed change in Title 10, Section 
12304 previously submitted to Congress does not suggest changes to the Insurrection Act 
or control over the National Guard. As discussed, changes made to the Insurrection Act in 
the FY07 National Defense Authorization Act remain a fearful concept where governors 
could lose control over their National Guard. Strong opposition to amending Title 10, 
Section 12304 was communicated to Congress, which has prevented the inclusion of this 
proposal in the National Defense Authorization Act.  
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F. EFFORTS TO REACH A COMPROMISE ON COMMAND AND 
CONTROL AND UNITY OF EFFORT 
1. Congressional Intervention and Oversight 
Congress has taken note that the National Guard, state governors, and the DoD 
need to work together and reach a comprise on command and control of military 
members in the homeland. Congress mandated several initiatives to address the command 
and control issues. In Section 1082 of the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense 
Authorization Act, Congress established an “advisory panel on Department of Defense 
capabilities for support to civil authorities after certain incidents” (Public Law 110-181, 
2008). The advisory panel, officially known as the “Advisory Panel on Department of 
Defense Capabilities for Support of Civil Authorities After Certain Incidents,” was 
overseen by the Federal Advisory Committee Act and was administered by the RAND 
Corporation. The panel members consisted of retired military members, former state 
officials, adjutants generals and other experts in homeland defense and civil support.4 
The panel conducted several public meetings with witnesses ranging from state and 
federal officials who were asked to share their perspectives on a number of issues from 
coordinated planning efforts, chemical or biological attacks, command and control of 
military, and call up of federal reserve forces for disaster response. One of the duties of 
the panel was to “evaluate the authorities and capabilities of the Department of Defense 
to conduct operations to provide support to United States civil authorities…” (RAND 
Corp., 2009). 
During a panel meeting on March 17, 2010, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Reserve Affairs, Dennis McCarthy, was asked to testify before the panel. When asked 
about ongoing command and control issues during and since Hurricane Katrina, Assistant 
Secretary McCarthy’s comments were summarized in official meeting minutes, “he has 
worked with Paul Stockton [Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and 
                                                 
4 The panel members were: Steve Abbot (ADM, USN, Ret) as Chairman, The Honorable Frank 
Keating as Vice Chairman, James Carafano PhD., Dennis Celletti (MG, ARNG), The Honorable James 
Greenwood, Jerry Grizzle (MG, USA, Ret), Ronald Harrison (MG, USA, Ret), Timothy Lowenberg (Maj 
Gen, ANG), James Metzger (VADM, USN, Ret), The Honorable George Nethercutt, Raymond “Fred” 
Rees (MG, ARNG), Dennis Reimer (GEN, USA, Ret), Ervin Rokke (Lt Gen, USAF, Ret) (Advisory Panel 
on Department of Defense Capabilities for Support of Civil Authorities After Certain Incidents, 2010). 
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Americas Security Affairs] in the past few months on unity of effort” and he “emphasized 
a need to come to an agreement that is satisfactory to both the governors and the 
president. He posited that one idea might be some sort of “supported” and “supporting” 
commander structure that would leave command of Title 10 forces to the President” 
(Rand Corp., April 10, 2010).  
At another panel meeting on June 2, 2010, Governor James Douglas of Vermont 
was asked to speak before the panel and in the official meeting minutes he expressed, 
“the National Governors Association wants Title 10 forces to operate under the tactical 
control of governors” (RAND Corp., July 2, 2010). It should be noted that Governor 
James Douglas was asked to speak before the panel because he was the co-chair of the 
Council of Governors, which is addressed shortly in this chapter.  
The advisory panel members met again over teleconference on July 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 
and 12, 2010 to begin collecting final conclusions and writing recommendations to the 
DoD and to Congress. The report was released on September 15, 2010 and while no 
mention of tactical control for state governors over federal military forces is made, 
specific findings and recommendations pertain to access to Title 10 federal reserve 
military forces. The summary states: 
Finding: The Title 10 Reserve Components include assets that might be 
valuable for CBRNE planning and response, but these assets are generally 
unavailable except for certain defined incidents. 
Recommendations: That the Secretary of Defense coordinate with the 
Council of Governors and then with the remaining Governors to identify 
Title 10 Reserve Component assets that may be beneficial in responding to 
the full range of CBRNE incidents—natural and manmade—and report 
these findings to the Congress. That the Congress expand statutory 
authority to allow for planning by and employment of Title 10 Reserve 
Component assets for any CBRNE incident, whether a result of terrorism 
or other causes. (Advisory Panel on Department of Defense Capabilities 
for Support of Civil Authorities After Certain Incidents, 2010) 
The findings and recommendations of the panel were submitted to the DoD and to 
Congress; however, no official action has been taken with regard to their 
recommendations.  
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The second congressionally mandated group formed to assess command and 
control of the military in the homeland and the use of Title 10 federal reserve forces in 
response to disasters is the Council of Governors. The Council of Governors was 
established by Executive Order consistent with section 1822 of the Fiscal Year 2008 
National Defense Authorization Act, which was signed by President Barack Obama on 
January 11, 2010 (The White House, 2010a). In a joint explanatory statement submitted 
by the Chairmen and ranking members of the House and Senate Committees on Armed 
Services, Congress recommended that the DoD “engage with the community of 
governors to work out an understanding of unity of effort during domestic terrorist events 
and public emergencies” (Public Law 110-417, 2008, p. 74). The White House selected 
ten governors and asked them to sit on the council with the intent to “strengthen further 
the partnership between the Federal Government and State governments to protect our 
Nation and its people and property” (The White House, 2010b). In addition to the ten 
governors, the federal officials designated to sit on the Council include the Secretary of 
Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Assistant to the President for 
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism; the Assistant to the President for 
Intergovernmental Affairs and Public Engagement; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs; the Commander, U.S. Northern 
Command; the Chief, National Guard Bureau; and the Commandant of the Coast Guard. 
Unfortunately, the establishment of the Council of Governors took longer than 
anticipated by both the DoD and the National Governors Association in part due to the 
change in administration. In a letter to the Chairmen and ranking members of the House 
and Senate Armed Services Committees in August 2009, the National Governors 
Association stated: 
We've encouraged DoD and the Administration to establish the Council of 
Governors to facilitate consultation and coordination between the 
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and governors 
on issues critical to homeland defense and emergency response. Your 
support in ensuring the Council of Governors is quickly established would 
help facilitate the dialog that must take place before any legislation 
regarding these issues moves forward. (National Governors Association, 
2009) 
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The letter from August 2009 also emphasized that governors were not yet ready to 
address a proposal from the DoD on access to federal reserve forces and stated that 
“recent outreach by officials at DoD to correspond with governors regarding their 
proposal is not sufficient to engender governors' support or justify moving ahead with the 
proposal at this time” (National Governors Association, 2009).  
Once President Obama signed the Executive Order in January 2010, the council 
could begin meeting and addressing issues of mutual interest to the states and the federal 
government. Among the objectives and scope of the Council of Governors, they were 
asked to specifically address “synchronization and integration of State and Federal 
military activities in the United States” (The White House, 2010a). The Council of 
Governors worked towards bridging the gap between state governors and the DoD 
regarding not only access to federal reserve forces but also the command and control of 
Title 10 forces, active and reserve, once employed in a state. It should be noted that other 
objectives relevant to state concerns and support to the National Guard exist that the 
council addresses in addition to these command and control matters. The National 
Governors Association was optimistic that the Council of Governors was “the appropriate 
forum for discussing this issue” because considerations with the DoD “should not be 
done hastily and should be designed to address concerns and forge understanding 
between governors and the department” (National Governors Association, 2009).  
2. Progress and Reaching Consensus to Create Unity of Effort 
Ongoing discussions with the Council of Governors has been the primary means 
of building consensus by the DoD with governors and the National Guard regarding 
command and control of military members operating in a state and access to Title 10 
federal reserve forces in response to disasters or emergencies. The Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs is the lead in 
the DoD for working with the National Governors Association, which supports the 
coordination and communication with the Council of Governors. Feedback from the 
Council of Governors’ meetings has concluded that constructive dialogue has been taking  
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place and governors are perhaps more comfortable that the DoD is making an effort to 
resolve concerns and reach an agreement with governors on the use of federal reserve 
forces in state disaster response. 
One major outcome from the Council of Governors was an initiative to develop a 
concept to build consensus called “Improving Unity of Effort: Direct Support Initiative,” 
which focused on creating a unity of effort among National Guard, governors and the 
DoD so that the nation is best prepared for a catastrophic disaster. The “Direct Support 
Initiative” offered the following components to build consensus with governors (Office 
of the Secretary of Defense Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs, 2010). 
• Emergency Management Accords Based on Direct Liaison Authority 
• Detailed State/Regional Contingency Planning 
• Establishment of State-specific pre-scripted mission assignments 
• Training and Exercising 
• Bringing Reserve Capabilities to Bear 
In a memo by the Secretary of Defense on “Improving Coordination and Unity of Effort 
with State Responders during Emergency Response Operations,” the secretary gave 
direction for the development of command and control options that will enable federal 
military forces “to consult, coordinate with, and respond to state authorities” (Office of 
the Secretary of Defense Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs, 2010). The 
Direct Support Initiative was the first step by the DoD and the Council of Governors to 
reach a consensus. As time passed and meetings continued in a positive direction, the 
initiative morphed into a plan for implementation, aptly entitled “Joint Action Plan for 
Developing Unity of Effort.”  
Admiral James Winnefeld, Commander of U.S. Northern Command, commented 
on the July 2010 Council of Governors meeting, “today's meeting was a very productive 
gathering that addressed a number of key topics to ensure Federal agencies respond 
quickly and in the right manner when governors request assistance from the Federal 
government for disasters and emergencies” (Admiral James Winnefeld, 2010). Following 
the March 2011 Council of Governor’s meeting, the National Governor’s Association 
released a statement about the gathering and the Joint Action Plan, “the Joint Action Plan 
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resolves long-standing concerns about who is in charge during domestic emergencies 
involving National Guard forces under the control of a governor and federal military 
forces under the control of the President” (National Governors Association, 2011). On 
December 13, 2011, Governor Chris Gregoire of Washington and Governor James 
Douglas of Vermont informed the Obama Administration that the “Council of Governors, 
on behalf of all governors, had approved the Joint Action Plan for Developing Unity of 
Effort” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 11, 2011). According to D. Elliott, 
(personal communication, May 26, 2011), Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 
Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, Paul Stockton, described that the Joint Action 
Plan, “calls for us to go much further than we have been able to do, in making sure that 
localities and federal and state have a shared understanding of each other's disaster 
response plans.”  
One of the key points of the Joint Action Plan is the concept of Contingency 
Dual-Status Command, otherwise known as CDSC or DSC, which is a command and 
control structure unifying both active and reserve military operating in a state for disaster 
and emergency response. “The CDSC concept is intended to achieve unity of effort when 
federal support is needed to support a state during a disaster” (Salzer, 2011). The 
objective of the command and control structure is to streamline operations under one 
commander who serves the state and federal chains of command and directs operations 
for both Title 10 and Title 32 military members working together.  
In February 2011, the subordinate command to USNORTHCOM, Joint Force 
Headquarters National Capital Region hosted National Guardsmen from 13 different 
states to discuss the CDSC concept during a conference to talk about the way ahead 
(Markfelder, 2011). USNORTHCOM officially established a CDSC training seminar at 
the headquarters in Colorado Springs, Colorado and Admiral Winnefeld testified in April 
2011 that “we have trained 31 National Guardsmen from 31 different States to be State 
JTF commanders who could be dual status qualified” (Senate Armed Services 
Committee, April 5, 2011, p. 9). The dual-status construct would employ either a Title 10 
or Title 32 commander and a deputy commander who would be from the other 
component. In addition, according to D. Elliott, (personal communication, May 26, 
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2011), “a dual status commander will be appointed at the mutual consent of the governor 
and the president and serves in two separate chains of command, both state and federal.”  
As of August 2011, the Joint Action Plan is currently in its implementation phase. 
National Guard and active duty military are undergoing CDSC training at U.S. Northern 
Command Headquarters. The CDSC was practiced during the May National Level 
Exercise on a New Madrid Earthquake scenario and employed during Hurricane Irene in 
four states. The CDSC has helped give state governors and their National Guard the 
flexibility and command they sought to oversee military operations in their respective 
states. As of August 2011, MOA’s are currently underway with 19 signed between the 
DoD and states. Eventually, each state will create a MOA that confirms the CDSC 
command and control concept according to each state’s perspective and capabilities. 
According to D. Elliott, (personal communication, May 26, 2011), in reference to the 
CDSC and MOA developments, Assistant Secretary Stockton stated, “the critical enabler 
to this progress was president's appointment to council of governors. The DoD, until that 
point, had no negotiating partner. We wanted to be more supportive of governors with 
FEMA, but we had no formal structure. The progress can be attributed to the appointment 
of the council of governors.”  
The history of this issue to date is a building block to the future of truly creating 
unity of effort among Title 10 and Title 32 military members. The case studies assessed 
in Chapter IV provide a road map and lessons learned to help define this future for 
military forces operating in the homeland. Chapter V continues to assess the best 
practices from the case studies and a nuanced application that could possibly lead to 
constructive policy change. As discussed above, sensitivities and complexities exist with 
command and control as it relates to federalism and state sovereignty that are dissimilar 
to the case studies. However, the successful takeaways from the case studies will prove to 
be applicable and will help create unity of effort between Title 32 and Title 10 military 
operating in the homeland.  
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IV. CASE STUDIES THAT SUGGEST A PARADIGM SHIFT 
Literally as well as metaphorically, the man accustomed to inverting 
lenses has undergone a revolutionary transformation of vision…Rather 
than being an interpreter, the scientist who embraces a new paradigm is 
like the man wearing inverting lenses. 
– Thomas Kuhn 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Although seemingly difficult to achieve, unity of effort does exist among various 
organizations across a range of fields and sectors. The ability to have multiple partners on 
the same sheet of music is possible with the right paradigm in place that works for all. 
The following case studies demonstrate that unity of effort can be achieved and they offer 
lessons or best practices that can be applied to Title 10 and Title 32 military forces 
responding to disasters and emergencies in the homeland. It should be noted that while 
federalism and state sovereignty are unique characteristics that challenge unity of effort 
for Title 10 and Title 32 military forces responding in the homeland, analogous 
circumstances are present among these case study organizations. It would be impossible 
to replicate the exact set of parameters at hand; however, valuable takeaways can be 
replicated to create unity of effort among these military forces. The following case 
studies illustrate that a paradigm shift is necessary to enable Title 10 and Title 32 military 
forces to create unity of effort when responding to emergencies in the homeland. 
B. ISRAELI HOME FRONT COMMAND: THE MILITARY PERSPECTIVE 
AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE IN RESPONSE TO MANMADE 
DISASTERS  
Successful practices founded in Israeli defense policy exist regarding Home Front 
Command emergency response operations where unity of effort is successful among 
response participants. Much can be learned from the Israeli experience and adopting 
Home Front Command practices would create a more unified response for Title 10 and 
Title 32 military forces in the homeland.  
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The current framework for emergency response operations for military forces in 
the U.S. homeland includes complicating variables due to respective authorities, as 
previously discussed. This dynamic is a factor that does not impact the State of Israel in 
setting its own defense policy and practices for emergency response operations in what 
they refer to as the “home front.” While the State of Israel does not have the complexity 
of federalism, many partners within the Israeli military framework participate and support 
emergency response operations. Namely, the emphasis on an “integrated service” in the 
Home Front Command is essential to the success of responding to emergencies and 
protecting the citizenry. 
1. Threat Comparison 
Unfortunately and fortunately, the United States has not had the same exposure to 
attacks as Israel; however, that does not mean that the current threat environments are 
that dissimilar. Israel and the United States are equally susceptible to transnational border 
issues, state aggression by sovereign powers, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and 
natural disasters (Larsen & Pravecek, 2006, p. ix). However, “Israelis are born into 
threat,” whereas the biggest attack on the homeland that Americans have ever faced was 
the terrorist attacks on 9/11 (Larsen & Pravecek, 2006, p. 4). While 9/11 marks a change 
in American history and how the United States counters emerging threats, the United 
States has not had the same exposure to threats and attacks that have transformed Israeli 
culture into a security-conscious society. Israel’s geographic location and proximity to 
adversaries has made the State of Israel more vulnerable to threats of which the United 
States has not yet faced, specifically, ballistic missile threats. Iran continues its 
“provocative behavior” with regard to the development of enriching uranium and the 
possibility of proliferating nuclear warheads that could not only target Israel but could 
also threaten the United States (Amiri, 2011). According to the American Israel Public 
Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the following map demonstrates Iran’s range and ability to 
target Israel with missile capabilities: 
 49
 
Figure 2.   Iranian missile threat map (From: The Irsael Project, 2011). 
On a day-to-day basis, Israelis must worry about the intentions of various adversaries 
attacking the State of Israel including Hezbollah from Lebanon and terrorists groups in 
the Gaza Strip, such as Hamas and Syria. Meanwhile, North Korea also continues its own 
“provocation” by attacking South Korea and ignoring countless warnings from the 
western world (Carafano, 2011). According to Carafano, “what makes North Korea so 
troublesome is the method by which it continues to command the world's attention. 
Pyongyang employs a combination of intimidation via nuclear weapons and outright 
armed attacks on the South” (Carafano, 2011). Time will tell how the ballistic missile 
threat may impact the United States but Israel is certainly more exposed to missiles and 
other projectiles on a day-to-day basis because of its geographic vulnerability. 
Acts of terrorism in Israel by missile attacks, suicide bombings, explosive 
devices, small arms shooting or other kinds of attacks are a part of Israel’s recent history 
that the society has been forced to accept. From January to March 2011, Israel faced 272 
separate terror attacks (Israeli Security Agency, 2011). In March alone, six fatalities and 
twenty-seven injuries occurred due to these attacks (Israeli Security Agency, 2011). 
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Although the United States has not experienced a successful act of terrorism or suicide 
bombing since 9/11, this does not mean that persons have not been plotting or attempting 
to execute attacks. The more high profile and recent attempted attacks, such as the 
Christmas Day Bomber in 2009 and the Times Square Bomber in 2010, have 
reemphasized U.S. vulnerability to terrorist threats and specifically “homegrown” 
terrorists. The reality of homegrown terrorists no longer makes the geographical location 
of the United States in the world a reliable factor to protect citizens from this asymmetric 
threat.  
Transnational border threats are increasingly relevant to the United States as the 
National Guard remains deployed at the southern border with Mexico and members of 
Congress refer to U.S. borders as “porous” that are “vulnerable to entry by terrorists and 
criminals” (Thompson B. , 2005). In July 2011, President Obama released a “Strategy to 
Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National 
Security” (The White House, July 19, 2011). The assessment by the White House 
concluded that transnational criminal organizations or TCOs are “proliferating, striking 
new and powerful alliances, and engaging in a range of illicit activities as never before” 
(The White House, July 19, 2011, p. 3). Of the transnational threats analyzed, a crime-
terror-insurgency nexus appears to exist, whereby 29 of the 63 organizations identified in 
the Department of Justice FY2010 Consolidated Priority Organization Targets list have a 
connection to terrorist groups (The White House, July 19, 2011, p. 6). Transnational 
threats with a terrorist nexus impact many nations; the United States and Israel are no 
exception.  
Natural disasters are at the whim of Mother Nature and no locality, state or 
country is impervious to this threat. The reality and experience in the United States is that 
the National Guard have been more than capable of handling operations following most 
natural disasters within a state. Of course, Hurricane Katrina is a resounding reminder 
that additional support from federal military members may be necessary and unity of 
effort will be critical to execute a successful emergency response effort to save lives and 
mitigate human suffering.  
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2. Experiential Differences Between the United States and Israel 
The geopolitical and experiential differences between Israel and the United States 
with regard to threat and attacks has led to different approaches and emphasis on 
“interagency cooperation” or what could be considered a unified response effort. Attacks 
and acts of terrorism have shaped the Israeli culture and created an environment in which 
citizens are keenly aware of threats and how to seek safety. As the citizenry has come to 
adapt to threats and attacks, the policies and practices have adapted as well to face these 
challenges. The United States will face new threats, natural or manmade, and must adapt 
to this environment by incorporating successful methods found in the Israeli experience. 
Synergy and synchronization of emergency response efforts go beyond the responsibility 
of the Home Front Command as part of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), the entire 
citizenry is aware that a strong civil defense means a safe home front.  
An overwhelming emphasis in Israel exists, from the military to the citizenry, to 
counter threats to the state through prevention methods and to respond efficiently to 
attacks and other emergencies when they occur. The day the State of Israel was 
established, then Zionist leader and later the first Prime Minister of Israel, David Ben 
Gurion said, “the entire people is the army, the entire land is the front” (The Home Front 
Command, 2011b). Israel later came to experience how very true this was and how the 
“front” became the vulnerable citizenry of the state itself. The Six Day War and the Yom 
Kippur War taught the State of Israel and its defense forces several vital lessons on how 
to organize defense and emergency response capabilities and the importance of 
preparation. Several iterations and changes to the defense structure in the State of Israel 
occurred, but it was not until the Gulf War in 1991 that the state realized it needed to take 
a new approach. Forty-two scud missile attacks from Iraq on Israel led to a realization 
that a more synchronized response structure was needed to protect the state from its 
vulnerable geopolitical environment in the Middle East (Department of Defense, 2000).  
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Figure 3.   Where Scuds landed in or near Israel (From: Department of Defense, 2000) 
“The Gulf War was a different type of war, a war in which the rear had to protect itself 
and in fact became the front” (The Home Front Command, 2011b). Lessons learned from 
attacks in the Gulf War led to the establishment of the Israeli Home Front Command in 
February 1992 to address civil defense from conventional and unconventional attacks and 
to focus on “preparation, organization, and a high state of readiness for the State of 
Israel” (The Home Front Command, 2011b). From this experience, Israel created a new 
command structure and shifted the defense paradigm to defend the home front better.  
3. Differences in Scale Influence Authorities 
The sheer size, population and mass differences between Israel and the United 
States have influenced the political dynamics that impact command and control of 
military members during emergency response operations. The State of Israel is one 
sovereign nation, although divided into six administrative districts: Jerusalem, North, 
Haifa, Center, Tel Aviv and South. In addition to the districts, the West Bank is also 
included, which is referenced by the biblical and historically significant areas of Judea 
and Samaria. The United States, however, has 54 sovereign states and territories that rely 
on their own National Guard and command and control structure when responding to 
emergencies. The scale of the nations has influenced the disparate authorities. Figures 4 
and 5 help demonstrate the difference in scale.  
  
 
 53
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.   Size comparison of Israel and 
the United States (From: 
Israel Ministry Foreign 
Affairs, 2004) 
Figure 5.   Size and districts of Israel 
(From: Wikipedia, 2006) 
On a national level, Israel does not have a separation of powers. The state itself has 
control over the national police, the military and intelligence apparatus. While local 
governments in Israel have jurisdiction over certain aspects of maintaining order and rule 
of law, no equivalent to “Title 32” state National Guard exists. The Israeli civil defense is 
founded in one command and control structure, the Home Front Command within the 
IDF.  
4. The Legal Authorities That Enhance the Israeli Emergency Response 
Apparatus 
To compliment the unified force structure of the Home Front Command, the 
Israel Defense Ministry created the National Emergency Management Authority or 
NEMA in 2007. NEMA is charged with preparing the Home Front Command for 
emergencies “by directing and coordinating between emergency organizations, 
government offices, local authorities, and other relevant institutions” (National 
Emergency Management Authority, 2011). NEMA has a number of responsibilities that 
support the unification of the civilian population with the Home Front Command, notably 
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“creating a long term plan for the improvement of Home front preparedness” and 
“organizing local and National Emergency Preparedness Exercises” (National Emergency 
Management Authority, 2011). The U.S. counterpart to NEMA might be a combination 
of the DHS and the FEMA given the responsibility to coordinate and direct emergency 
organizations at various levels to develop better a coordinated emergency response effort 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2008). The United States is the only country that 
combines the responsibilities of DHS and FEMA into one organization as the lead in the 
U.S. homeland for disaster and emergency response. In addition, these agencies operate 
under a separate command and control structure from the military, both Title 10 and Title 
32. That being said, U.S. military members are expected to adhere to the guidance set 
forth by FEMA in the National Response Framework and DHS in Presidential Directives 
5 and 8 (Department of Homeland Security, 2009). Unlike the United States, the Ministry 
of Defense or MOD in Israel takes on the lead authority for response operations and the 
IDF establishes its own command and control structure outside of the MOD for 
operations in the home front. NEMA currently serves as a coordinating agency to the 
response operations and does not have control or authority over the IDF and Home Front 
Command.  
Similar to NEMA, the Emergency Economy System in Israel was designed to 
augment the Home Front Command by providing “essential public services during war” 
(Israel Defense Force, 2002). Since Home Front Command forces are civilian reservists, 
their departure from everyday jobs to serve during an emergency could hurt the Israeli 
economy so the Emergency Economy System was established to sustain critical 
industries and maintain a functioning economic system that supports citizens. In 2002, Lt. 
Gen. (Res.) Arnon Ben-Ami, stated, “the army has always the top priority since it is 
fighting in the front. Therefore, it was required to establish a system that will coordinate 
the governmental offices and the local authorities needs against the army needs and will 
set priorities during war or nature disaster” (Israel Defense Force, 2002). The Emergency 
Economy System fills a similar function as the FEMA and public sector partners, such as  
 
 
 55
Wal-Mart, by providing sustained emergency response and recovery support with goods 
and services. However, this is a requirement in Israel among designated organizations 
and citizens can be fined if they disregard the Emergency Economy System.  
A specific legal authority exists in Israel during times of increased emergency for 
which the United States does not have a comparative authority. The Special Situation 
authority essentially allows the Defense Minister, using the Home Front Command, the 
authority to control the civilian population for certain functions that contribute to 
emergency operations. In 2007, the Special Situation authorization gave “the Home Front 
Command the authority to order employees at vital workplaces, such as supermarkets and 
health clinics, to report for work. The Command can also order the police to station more 
forces in the affected area” (Fendel, 2007). Neither the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
or the Secretary of Defense nor the President of the United States has the authority to 
order the civilian population to assist and participate in emergency response operations. 
In addition, none of these positions has the authority to order civilians to continue 
working in functional areas that support an emergency operation or require essential 
services to stay open to maintain a steady economy. Although differences clearly exist in 
the legal mechanisms to access military and civilian forces in Israel that may not be able 
to be replicated in the United States, the command and control construct to direct military 
forces are assessed. 
5. Command and Control  
The Home Front Command is a component of the IDF as the national response 
and defense capability that assists citizens when emergencies, natural or manmade, occur. 
The Home Front Command is an institution that culturally serves the greater public and 
whose responsibility is to protect and respond when the citizenry needs support. Before 
the Home Front Command was established, emergency response forces fell under the 
control of Civilian Defense’s Chief Officer Corps Command and under a Regional 
Defense structure (The Home Front Command, 2011b). The unification of forces under 
one command and control structure of the Home Front Command is an important factor 
when assessing Israel’s emergency response policy. The Home Front Command is “an 
 56
integrated service of readiness and response for civil defense during states of emergency, 
showing initiative and leadership and setting an example; organized and ready to fulfill 
its functions with excellence” (The Home Front Command, 2011c). The emphasis on an 
“integrated service” in the Home Front Command is essential to the success of 
responding to emergencies and protecting the citizenry. The Israeli Home Front 
Command is a hybrid of emergency response organizations and military command and 
control structures similar to the United States. The military forces responding are 
essentially reserve military members and are a part of the larger IDF apparatus, just as the 
National Guard in Title 32 status fit into the total U.S. Armed Forces structure. However, 
Home Front Command military members operate under the command and control of the 
State of Israel, just as Title 10 Active Duty forces assigned to USNORTHCOM operate 
under federal command and control in the United States.  
In the United States, the DHS, FEMA, DoD, USNORTHCOM and the National 
Guard all have a role and responsibility in executing DSCA missions. The DoD always 
supports the DHS or FEMA for a DSCA mission and may utilize Title 10 federal forces 
to do so with USNORTHCOM, leading up to the President, in command and control. At 
the same time, when a DSCA mission is executed, those Title 10 federal forces currently 
operate in parallel to Title 32 National Guard forces who fall under the command and 
control of their respective state governor. Under Article 2 of the Constitution, the 
President of the United States is also sovereign and has control of the U.S. Armed Forces, 
to include the National Guard when an insurrection is declared. The political dynamic 
that ensues from this dichotomy of sovereign power over military forces is a root cause, 
among others, for ineffective unity of effort emergency response operations in the United 
States. Command and control challenges stifle DSCA missions and operations because 
synergy and unity of effort is lacking among military members in Title 10 and Title 32 
status. Figure 6 provides further details to illustrate the parallel chains of command 
regarding the command and control of military forces under the President and state 
governors. 
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Figure 6.   Parallel chains of command (From: Burkett, 2008). 
The military status, either Title 10 or Title 32, determines who is in command and 
control of those forces. Table 1 helps breakdown each status, to include state active duty. 
 
Table 1.   T10 and T32 military status (From: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 
2010). 
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It should be noted that many efforts to connect these parallel command structures 
have occurred.5 For example, the DoD established the position of Defense Coordinating 
Officers (DCO) in each of the 10 FEMA regions to understand and coordinate anticipated 
requests for defense capabilities, which are then communicated to USNORTHCOM for 
action to support a state in a timely manner (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
2010). DCO’s work with a state Joint Field Office (JFO) to maintain connectivity and 
strengthen relationships with state emergency operators, including Title 32 National 
Guard. In addition to the DCO position, State Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers 
or EPLOs and Regional Defense Officers or RDOs are other ways in which the DoD, 
FEMA, states and the National Guard have tried to create seamless communication 
during response operations. These partners are committed to creating an operational unity 
of effort so a willingness may exist to consider a paradigm shift found in the Home Front 
Command where operational synergy is successful.  
6. Policy Implications to Support a Paradigm Shift  
The Home Front Command’s ability to coordinate with other emergency 
responders has been an effective policy because the society recognizes the need for a 
stable civil defense. Israel has had to adapt its security and response efforts over the years 
because of ever-changing and unpredictable threats and attacks to its home front where 
“circumstances have forced the IDF to be a world leader in homeland defense” 
(Greenhill, 2010). Figure 7 represents Israeli fatalities by different kinds of attacks from 
September 29, 2000 to the end of 2009: 
 
                                                 
5 See also the Department of Defense Report to Congress: Plan for Coordinating National Guard and 
Federal Military Force Disaster Response released June 23, 2011. 
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Figure 7.   Distribution of fatalities (From: Israel Security Agency, 2010) 
Given Israel’s geopolitical vulnerability and threats the state faces, its citizenry has 
experienced enough violence and atrocities to accept policies and procedures established 
by the state to protect the state. For the most part, Israelis innately trust their government 
to take the necessary steps to protect them and they do not question motives or decisions 
that support that effort. The threats and attacks that Israelis have faced contributes to the 
overall cultural acceptance and adherence to trust in a government that creates a strong 
civil defense. Thus, little to no objection is raised when synchronizing emergency 
response efforts under one command and control apparatus led by the Home Front 
Command.  
Numerous attacks and acts of terrorism have shaped the Israeli culture and created 
an environment in which citizens are intensely aware of the threats they face and support 
the Home Front Command’s effort to respond to them. The Home Front Command has 
tried to reach out to the Israeli public continuum and include them in the civil defense 
dialogue so they understand what to do when an attack occurs (The Home Front 
Command, 2011a). The Home Front Command website, for example, is tailored to 
educating Israeli citizens so that they are informed and understand how to respond when 
an emergency or attack occurs. Guidance is customized according to the emergency in 
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the “How to Act in an Emergency” section, from earthquake to a mortar attack (The 
Home Front Command, 2011a). Assistance on the website offers even more specific 
direction regarding shelter locations depending on where an individual lives within the 
state. In fact, every single citizen is expected to participate in national exercises to 
rehearse emergency response practices (Greenhill, 2010). This outlook on 
synchronization, from emergency responder to military members to citizen, is what has 
been effective for the State of Israel in its home front defense posture and put Israel as a 
leader in homeland defense in this regard.  
7. Applying the Israeli Model 
The National Guard and USNORTHCOM have already established a working 
relationship and military exchange with the IDF and the Home Front Command to find 
and trade “information about technologies, tactics, techniques and procedures to improve 
security, crisis response and consequence capabilities” (Greenhill, 2010). In 2005, Larsen 
and Pravecek’s research and analysis on the Israeli experience in homeland defense led to 
key lessons that could be applied to the United States in the following areas: know your 
adversary, interagency cooperation, tight internal security, profiling, protected spaces, 
barriers, information sharing between two states, public education, offensive military 
action, security decision-making, compromise and appeasement and advanced technology 
(Larsen & Pravecek, 2006). Of these lessons, emphasis on cooperation and compromise 
are much needed for unity of effort among Title 10 and Title 32 military members.  
Statutory authorities specified for use by Home Front Command in a limited state 
of emergency is not an applicable approach in the United States. Federalism and the use 
of Title 10 military members in the U.S. homeland are a restrictive, Constitutional reality 
that will not be revoked. While Israel does not face the same circumstance of state and 
federal sovereignty found in Title 10 and Title 32 as the United States, the state still deals 
with the issue of authority and command relationships for its emergency response 
operations. Whether it is the coordination of local emergency responders or additional 
military forces, the Home Front Command works in a unified construct when responding 
to an emergency in the state. Thus, for the purpose of comparison and assessment, the 
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successful practices that have led to unity of effort between the larger IDF and Home 
Front Command can be applied to Title 10 and Title 32 military responders. The pointed 
emphasis on a single, synchronized command and control structure can be applied to 
Title 10 and Title 32 military members for DSCA missions but it will take a cultural shift 
based on a realistic outlook of future threats and formalized agreements emphasizing a 
collective consensus among stakeholders. 
C. FLORIDA DIVISION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT: THE 
CIVILIAN PERSPECTIVE AND DOMESTIC EXPERIENCE IN 
RESPONSE TO NATURAL DISASTERS  
The state of Florida has been recognized for its successful emergency 
management operations and “as a matter of record, Florida’s disaster response is the most 
effective in America and serves as a national model” (McBride-Davis, 2008, p. 18). The 
processes and procedures that the state of Florida has put into action for hurricanes have 
proven to be effective (McBride-Davis, 2008, p. 18). Thus, what has worked for Florida 
that has been so effective? Multiple agencies, counties and personnel have contributed to 
emergency management in the state; therefore, assessing how Florida has created a 
unified effort may yield constructive options for Title 10 and Title 32 military forces to 
replicate. It is important to note that while assessing Florida’s emergency management 
construct, no reasonable manner exists in which to compare the military as previously 
conducted with the Home Front Command in Israel. Meaning, Title 32 and Title 10 
military will always support a state with a DSCA mission, and thus, evaluating the 
military’s response to a state function would produce an unbalanced comparison. For the 
purpose of this case study, the author assesses the Florida emergency response to 
determine best practices that are then further analyzed in Chapter V.  
1. Threat Environment for the State of Florida 
Former Governor of Florida, Charlie Crist, has stated, “no state is more 
vulnerable than Florida to natural disasters” (Florida State Emergency Response Team, 
2007). Florida has experienced more hurricanes and tropical storms than any other state 
in the United States (see Table 2). According to the National Hurricane Center, 
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approximately “forty percent of all U.S. hurricanes and major hurricanes hit Florida” and 
“eighty-three percent of category 4 or higher hurricane strikes have hit either Florida or 
Texas” (National Hurricane Center, 2007).  
 
 
Table 2.   Hurricanes on U.S. coastline and by individual states from 1851–2006 
(From: National Hurricane Center, 2007). 
The coastline of Florida is a “length of 1350 statute miles,” which is “more than any 
other state in the nation” (Florida Division of Emergency Management, 2007). The 
National Emergency Management Association conducted a survey to compare 
emergency management organizations among states (see Table 3). Although Florida 
ranks third in historically declared disasters, the emergency management budget and 
number of personnel dedicated to emergency management is relatively modest compared 
to other states with a smaller population and fewer disasters.  
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Table 3.   How Florida compares to other state emergency management (EM) agencies 
(From: Florida Division of Emergency Management, 2007). 
The financial impact on Florida must also be considered. According to FEMA, of the top 
ten most expensive Presidentially declared disasters between 1992 and 2005, Florida was 
impacted by all but three disasters (see Table 4).  
 
 
Table 4.   Comparison of most expensive presidentially declared disasters (From: 
Florida Division of Emergency Management, 2007). 
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Indeed, Florida’s experience with natural disasters, primarily hurricanes and tropical 
storms, has influenced the state’s perspective on its threat environment. Its experience 
with loss of life, property damage and cost of rebuilding communities after these disasters 
eventually led to a more robust emergency management construct.  
2. Experience Leads to a Coordinated Planning Approach 
Hurricane Andrew demonstrated problems existed with “interagency coordination, 
preparedness and response” in Florida and state officials realized that something needed 
to change. “Floridians learned that human institutions and decisions had a real influence 
on whether a community suffered substantial hurricane damage” (Birkland, 2006, p. 
146). Thus, following Hurricane Andrew in 1992, the state of Florida refocused its 
emergency management efforts and by 1994, the State Emergency Response Team or 
SERT was established under the Florida Division of Emergency Management or DEM. 
The DEM and SERT mission is defined as “working together to ensure that Florida is 
prepared to respond to emergencies, recover from them, and mitigate against their 
impacts” (Florida Division of Emergency Management, 2011). The DEM seems to 
uphold the value of working together collaboratively by creating the motto “semper 
gumby—always flexible” (Florida Division of Emergency Management, 2011). 
Remaining flexible is a characteristic addressed further in this case study. It was not until 
Hurricane Opal in 1996 and the floods caused by El Nino in 1997 that mitigation projects 
“were galvanized into action” (Miami-Dade County, 2000, p. 2). A common realization 
occurred that incorporating local communities in the planning and mitigation process 
would not only empower those individuals’ “planning and decision making” but would 
ultimately produce a more cohesive mitigation strategy (Miami-Dade County, 2000, p. 
2). Over 14 million dollars was invested in 1997 towards a statewide mitigation project. 
A mix of Florida state funding and FEMA grants supported the mitigation project that 
focused on Local Mitigation Strategies or LMS. The state of Florida provided a Local 
Mitigation Strategies (LMS) guidebook for locals to reference standards and procedures 
when creating their mitigation plans. In due course, “the project provided funding for 
cities and counties to work together to prepare a single, unified LMS that serves as a 
bridge between local government’s comprehensive and emergency management plans” 
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(Miami-Dade County, 2000). In Miami-Dade County alone, there are over thirty 
municipalities and each one contributed to the LMS project. The Florida mitigation 
strategy pyramid focused on community-based planning and LMS (see Figure 8).  
 
 
Figure 8.   Florida mitigation pyramid (From: L. Thompson, 2005) 
Ultimately, the LMS program gave local communities the opportunity to start 
working with other agencies in Florida that participate in emergency management. Local 
communities felt a vested interest to participate in the LMS project because they 
recognized the benefit of effective planning and precoordination among other Florida 
state entities (Miami-Dade County, 2000). According to a report focused on Florida 
partnerships and “working together,” the “LMS program has created an unprecedented 
degree of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies, as well as educational 
institutions, private relief organizations, business, and community organizations” 
(Miami-Dade County, 2000). The disaster experience in Florida has created a culture in 
the state in which citizens understand and appreciate the importance of preparation and 
planning (McBride-Davis, 2008). The experience and cultural influence was a factor in 
the willingness of local communities and state agencies to participate in the LMS process. 
Florida’s experience with disaster influenced a culture of preparation and mitigation, 
which is addressed further in Chapter V.  
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3. Formalizing the Planning Process with Community Partners  
The Disaster Mitigation Act in 2000 was incorporated as Section 322 of 
Mitigation Planning within the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act. The Disaster Mitigation Act in 2000 “revitalized approaches to 
mitigation planning” and focused on “the need for State and local entities to closely 
coordinate mitigation planning and implementation efforts” (Florida Department of 
Community Affairs, 2011). The Act in 2000 also “established a requirement for local 
mitigation plans” (Florida Department of Community Affairs, 2011). The Section 322 
requirement for local and state mitigation plans mandated that communities had to 
contribute plans so that the state could be eligible for pre- and post-disaster mitigation 
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) funds (Birkland, 2006, p. 111). Florida is 
only one of seven states that requires communities to prepare plans with a natural disaster 
element (Birkland, 2006, p. 143). According to Birkland, “Florida’s mandate is quite 
strong” whereby the state reviews all community plans for consistency with the overall 
state plan. Eventually, the State Hazard Mitigation Plan was adopted in 2004 and has 
since been updated in 2007 and 2010 (Florida Division of Emergency Management, 
2010). During this time of creating coordinated planning, citizens often referred to 
mitigation as “breaking the cycle” to move past the cycle of repairing damage from 
disasters only to repair them again the next time a disaster should occur. 
The Florida DEM has made a concerted effort to incorporate local communities in 
the planning effort and asked its citizens to take on a planning role to prepare each 
community and state as a whole properly. The importance of the community perspective 
was at the core of the Florida DEM while under the leadership of Mr. Craig Fugate from 
2001 to 2009, which was reaffirmed in a hearing before the U.S. Congress when he 
stated, “I think if you are going to be successful in any scale disaster, including 
catastrophic, you have to design plans that address the needs of a community” (Ad Hoc 
Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery for the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, 2009). The DEM’s focus on the planning process and  
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coordinating efforts with the community paid off in 2003 when Florida “became the first 
state emergency management program in the nation to receive full accreditation from the 
Emergency Management Accreditation Program” (The White House, 2009).  
4. Emphasizing Partnerships and Synchronizing Efforts 
The ability for the DEM to synchronize efforts in Florida has certainly contributed 
to its effective planning process and partnerships with local communities, state agencies 
and the private sector. An open and inclusive environment has been established and in 
2008, the number one short-term priority was “partnerships” so that the state could ensure 
“capabilities at all levels will be accomplished by encouraging staff to provide premium 
customer service to Florida citizens, local governments, and State agencies” (Florida 
Division of Emergency Management, 2008, p. 8).  
The emphasis on partnerships was no doubt due in part to the Director of the 
DEM, Mr. Craig Fugate. During testimony before the U.S. Congress, Mr. Fugate stated, 
“I believe in partnerships” when referencing the importance of FEMA working with state 
and locals for disaster planning and mitigation (Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster 
Recovery for the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2009). 
Indeed, Mr. Fugate’s career began in 1987 as a lieutenant in the Alachua County Fire 
Rescue Department and he eventually moved to the county level as an emergency 
manager. After 10 years supporting his community, he was appointed as the Director of 
the Florida Division of Emergency Management during which time he successfully 
managed and led his state towards a “model” planning and response construct. Upon his 
nomination as the FEMA Administrator, DHS Secretary, Janet Napolitano, stated, “he is 
one of the most respected emergency managers in the nation, and the work he’s 
accomplished in Florida serves as a model for other states to follow” (The White House, 
2009). Effective leadership can influence mission partners and resolve issues to reach 
unity. The nomination of Mr. Fugate to lead FEMA certainly demonstrates his ability to 
lead effectively in Florida, which was sought to lead disaster responses at the national  
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and federal level. Strong leadership in Florida is an important factor that supported the 
concept of creating partnerships to synchronize planning and unity of effort during 
response operations.  
In addition to Mr. Fugate’s leadership to build partnerships, other effective 
initiatives were in place to examine hurricane policies that brought multiple stakeholders 
in Florida together. The Governor’s Hurricane Conference began in 1987 and has been an 
annual event that promotes knowledge sharing among state, local and federal officials. 
According to Birkland, “the conference has become an important learning mechanism” 
for the participants and has yielded productive outcomes for mitigation planning in 
Florida (Birkland, 2006, p. 140). Also, following Hurricane Andrew in 1992, it is well 
understood that FEMA and Florida failed to coordinate effectively. Then Governor 
Chiles established the Governor’s Disaster Planning and Response Review Committee to 
discover why the coordination was “broken” and what could be done to fix it (Birkland, 
2006, p. 141). The committee made 94 recommendations and many were adopted by the 
Florida legislature. Birkland posits that the “key catalyst” to adopting many of the 
committee’s recommendation was due to the disastrous experience Floridians had with 
Hurricane Andrew (Birkland, 2006, p. 143). In the end, it was clear that better 
synchronization is contingent on partnerships with communities and other partners.  
5. One Chain of Command 
In 2008, a Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats or SWOT Analysis 
was conducted and found that Florida’s biggest strength was the DEM’s ability “to 
coordinate multi-functional emergency tasks among a variety of government and private 
agencies” (Florida Division of Emergency Management, 2008, p. 10). In the 
opportunities portion of the SWOT analysis, “the importance of having a single point of 
command and control in any emergency” was identified by those who work with the 
DEM (Florida Division of Emergency Management, 2008). During a disaster, the 
Governor of Florida can activate the SERT, which operates as the lead organization in a 
single chain of command, which “ensures communication with local authorities, 
coordinates state response efforts, and facilitates federal disaster recovery funding for 
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individuals and governments” (United States House of Representatives Committee on 
Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response and 
Communications, 2011). The SERT maintains all planning, logistical and financial 
coordination; however, the elected officials in a local community maintain their 
“operational control” in their respective areas.  
Florida’s new approach following the devastation caused by Hurricane Andrew 
paid off during the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons and the state and local partners who 
had been conducting mitigation planning and preparing together “quickly mobilized, 
worked together” to provide response and recovery support to its citizens (Gerencser, 
Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 27). This kind of unified response or what could 
be called “collective leadership” that has taken place in Florida is a prime example of a 
“megacommunity” model (Gerencseret al., 2008, p. 28). A “megacommunity” recognizes 
that to fix problems or issues, mission partners and organizations must come together as a 
collective group and take action that addresses those issues and benefits everyone. 
Florida created unity of effort and accomplish common goals by organizing assets and 
people to resolve problems identified from experience with disasters.  
6. Applying the Florida Model 
Florida’s flexible and interconnected emergency management apparatus has 
proven to be successful before and in response to emergencies in the state. The 
“megacommunity” has made many strides since Hurricane Andrew to institute mitigation 
efforts and create a unified response team comprised of local, state and private sector 
partners. The issues that surround unity of effort among Title 10 and Title 32 military 
members are not equivalent to the state of Florida. That being said, the manner in which 
Florida has applied certain concepts and constructs are applicable to Title 10 and Title 32 
response missions in the homeland.  
Florida’s emphasis on partnerships and coordination is at the root of its success. 
The Local Mitigation Strategies (LMS) initiative brought people and organizations 
together in a new way that not only accomplished the goal of developing local strategies 
to be integrated into an overall state strategy, but it also opened communication channels 
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among these organizations for future cooperation. Florida had the ability to set 
requirements for local strategies, which definitely factors into their coordinated success. 
Unfortunately, requiring coordination among Title 10 and Title 32 military members is 
not something that can be mandated; however, that does not mean that cooperation and 
building partnerships cannot be fostered through other means.  
A unified chain of command is another successful take-away from the Florida 
Division of Emergency Management. Again, while federalism is not a factor in the state 
managed operations, jurisdictional issues are at play with many state, local and private 
sector mission partners. The Florida Division of Emergency Management has a 
synchronized command and control system for emergency response operations under the 
State Emergency Response Team. Additionally the command and control construct in 
Florida preserves operational control to the local community, which can be directly 
applied to the issue of command and control of Title 10 military operating within a state.  
D. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE CASE STUDIES 
Strengths and weaknesses exist with regard to the applicability of these case 
studies to creating unity of effort among Title 10 and Title 32 military members for 
response operations in the homeland. Overall, the biggest strength gleaned from these 
case studies is that unity of effort among mission partners responding to disasters or 
emergencies is possible. However, some factors resident in these case studies do not 
translate to the current situation.  
1. Strengths 
Substantive evidence appears to exist that response operations under the Home 
Front Command in Israel and the Florida Division of Emergency Management’s use of 
one chain of command is more effective than separate chains of command. When 
communication among mission partners, whether military, civilian leadership or both, is 
given great emphasis, it can positively impact unity of effort. Evaluating unity of effort in 
response to natural and manmade attacks substantiates that unity can be achieved in  
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response to “all hazards” impacting the United States. Ultimately, these case studies offer 
operational constructs and methods to corral support from stakeholders that can improve 
unity of effort. 
2. Weaknesses 
Given the experiential differences in Florida and Israel, it is clear from the 
research that citizens in these areas are more flexible and willing to take on new policies 
and requirements that enhance disaster or emergency response operations. Unfortunately, 
the reality of federalism and state sovereignty in the United States challenges the 
establishment of these types of policies or requirements, which must be considered when 
replicating best practices. In addition, the experience with disasters has impacted the 
cultures in Israel and Florida, which again is not an exact comparison and must be 
analyzed.  
E. SUMMARY 
The ultimate goal of assessing these cases was to find proven, reasonable ways to 
approach the problem of unity of effort between Title 10 and Title 32 military during 
response missions in the homeland. Looking to history, lessons learned and successful 
models for creating unity of effort will only educate and enhance the reader’s perspective 
and appreciation for the concept when it is successfully implemented. The case studies 
cover the breadth of possible scenarios that face the U.S. homeland, from acts of 
terrorism to natural disasters. In addition, these cases touch on military, civilian, 
international and domestic perspectives that demonstrate unity of effort does not have to 
be defined by statutory authorities, location, position or form of government. The Home 
Front Command and the Florida Division of Emergency Management have much in 
common that can help determine a way ahead for unity of effort among military members 
operating in the homeland. Their successful experience with a synchronized, unified 
effort suggests that a paradigm shift is not only possible but also essential. The next 
chapter seeks to fill the knowledge gap that afflicts the creation of unity of effort among 
Title 10 and Title 32 military by outlining the complexities of culture and perspective that 
separate them and identifying best practices that can assist them.  
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V. SO WHAT? ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
The world as we have created it is a process of our thinking. It cannot be 
changed without changing our thinking. 
– Albert Einstein 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The following chapter synthesizes the issues that affect Title 10 and Title 32 
military members’ ability to create an operational unity of effort during response 
missions in the homeland. It is important to understand and appreciate the complexities to 
move forward; thus, analyzing the issues that have hindered unity of effort among 
military are addressed and findings presented. The case studies are also analyzed to 
provide constructive findings that should be used to shape policy and a pathway of 
creating unity of effort among Title 10 and Title 32 military members. In doing so, this 
chapter serves to fill the knowledge gap that exists among the active and reserve so that a 
reasonable approach for a way forward can be determined.  
B. CULTURE, CONFLICT AND PERSPECTIVE 
According to Rufus Miles, “where you stand depends on where you sit” (Miles, 
1978). One issue that has contributed to the lack of unity before and during response 
missions in the homeland among Title 10 and Title 32 military members relates to the 
underlying cultural differences and perspectives among them. Although, members of the 
active and reserve military serve one nation, they often do so in different roles, under 
different authorities and with different responsibilities. These differences, over time, have 
created separate cultures, which influence how they identify themselves as a group, or 
rather, as a component in the U.S. Armed Forces. The following analysis is not meant to 
suggest that separate components and cultures are harmful but yet that conflict resulting 
from their different cultures should and can be resolved. Former Secretary of Defense, 
Robert Gates, expressed his thoughts on culture and adapting to change in a new threat 
environment while speaking to the Air War College in 2008, when he stated:  
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this new set of realities and requirements have meant a wrenching set of 
changes for our military establishment…The really tough part is 
preserving those elements of the culture that strengthen the institution and 
motivate the people in it, while shedding those elements of the culture that 
are barriers to progress and achieving the mission. All of the services must 
examine their cultures critically, if we are to have the capabilities relevant 
and necessary to overcome the most likely threats America will face in 
years to come. (Department of Defense, 2008) 
Unfortunately, the most likely threats that Americans will face in the homeland for years 
to come are not only natural disasters but also possibly terrorist attacks. Overcoming 
cultural barriers is critical to create an environment in which Title 10 Active Duty and 
Title 32 National Guard can effectively and efficiently respond to emergencies and 
disasters in a unified effort in the homeland. “Now is an opportune time for the U.S. 
government to bridge the cultural, bureaucratic and budgetary gulf that still divides full-
time active duty and reserve personnel” (Nagl & Sharp, 2010, p. 7).  
1. Social Identity and Institutional Pathology  
First, it is important to consider the sociological understanding of group dynamics 
and an individual’s propensity to join a group and adhere to its policies and/or its culture. 
The group that an individual adopts defines an individual’s social identity. Tajfel’s work 
on social identity theory and substantive research on intergroup behavior helps explain 
why people identify with a group by self-categorization and self-enhancement processes 
(Robinson & Tajfel, 1996, p. 67). In other words, considerable sociological research 
concludes that individuals choose a group to belong to and consider the group their social 
identity. Moreover, when an individual identifies with a certain group or an “ingroup,” 
then other groups that an individual does not belong to then become the “outgroup” 
(Robinson & Tajfel, 1996, p. 68). The tension and conflict that results from the “ingroup-
outgroup” dynamic can reasonably be attributed to many factors including religious, 
racial, ethnic, cultural and other differences. This sociological understanding of the 
“ingroup-outgroup” dynamic relates to Title 10 and Title 32 military members and the 
way they interact with each other, specifically during response missions in the homeland.  
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Each organization discussed in Chapter III that has been involved in creating 
unity of the effort for military in the homeland has an institutional pathology that is 
disparate from the other. According to Caplin and Nalebuff (1992), whether 
“membership-based” or “position-based,” an individual will select or associate with a 
particular “institution” based on its anticipated choices and policies. Further, once an 
institution has selected its policies, “no individual wishes to switch to another institution” 
(Caplin & Nalebuff, 1992). The varying views on how to create unity of effort and 
command and control of military forces within a state are all distinct depending on the 
institution to which an individual relates or belongs. Understanding the perspective of 
each institution will help breakdown the barriers that define them. This does not mean 
that institutions should concede their views or policies; however, it does imply that being 
open to learning and sharing ideas could eventually bring the institutions closer to solving 
a problem.  
These separate groups or “institutions” have developed separate cultures and a 
natural conflict has occurred over time. There is nothing new about intergroup tension 
and conflict; however, resolving the issues that infer separate cultures and group 
identities can be challenging. It is important to consider their differences to seek ways to 
resolve a cultural conflict. 
2. The Differences That Define Them 
One way to describe the difference between the active duty and the reserve 
component is equating time in service by full-time and part-time status. According to the 
Army, an active duty soldier has a full-time job of training, whereas, an army reserve 
soldier can expect to spend one weekend a month training and one two-week field 
training exercise commitment a year (U.S. Army, 2011). Similar to the Army Reserve, 
the Army National Guard also train one weekend a month and one two-week exercise 
period a year. Over time, some have referred to members of the reserve component as 
“weekend warriors” because of the weekend commitments required for training. 
Although not seemingly negative, this moniker carries a stigma that members of the 
Reserve Component do not have the same requirements or expertise as those in the active 
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duty. Both active and reserve forces can be called upon for Title 10 Active Duty service 
in support of wartime operations. That being said, the rotation cycles differ between the 
active and reserve components and among the services as well. For the most part, the 
active duty wartime rotation cycle is on a shorter string than the reserve component; thus, 
active duty members are called upon more often to return to overseas operations. 
Training requirements, time in service, professional education and differences in overseas 
deployments are some areas in which varying service commitments lead to separate 
cultures, not just components, in the active and reserve military.  
With regard to training, Title 10 Active Duty members are training for various 
overseas missions in a full-time status. As “citizen soldiers,” Title 32 National 
Guardsmen train for overseas missions, as well as those civil support missions that they 
expect their local community and state governor will request. Thus, training and expertise 
can mean something different and certainly impacts how these cultures interrelate. 
USNORTHCOM has made efforts to train Title 10 Active Duty members to understand 
the DSCA mission better and how to relate to civilian authorities outside their chain of 
command (U.S. Northern Command, 2011). This kind of training is one way in which 
Title 10 Active Duty are increasing awareness of the civil support expertise that Title 32 
National Guard inherently understand. DSCA training for Title 10 Active Duty members 
is an educational, interdisciplinary opportunity that can be used to overcome cultural 
obstacles. 
In the realm of training for joint experience, the Active Duty and Reserve 
Component are held to the same standards for the DoD Joint Officer Management 
Program under Title 10 of U.S. Code (10 USC Sec. 661). The very essence of joint 
experience is applying an interdisciplinary approach to training and education, whereby 
officers learn from “a heightened awareness of joint requirements, including multi-
service, interagency, international, and non-governmental perspectives” (Department of 
Defense Instruction 1300.19, 2010). In accordance with DoDI 1300.19, to progress to 
higher ranks within your service and be selected for a general or flag officer position, it is 
necessary to be “joint qualified” based on “achievement and/or completion of education, 
training, and experience that develop and utilize knowledge, skills, and abilities relevant 
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to the definition of joint matters” (Department of Defense Instruction 1300.19, 2010). It 
is constructive that both the active and reserve components are held to the same standards 
in this regard; however, the National Guard are not afforded the same opportunities as the 
active duty for joint experience to become “joint qualified.” All too often, members of a 
National Guard unit within a given state will rise in the ranks within their organization 
but will not have the opportunity to serve in joint commands or at echelons above a 
brigade or wing. It should be noted that while additional joint training and experience 
opportunities could be provided to National Guard members, each state has its own 
standards under the authority of a state governor to promote a National Guardsman to the 
general or flag officer rank. The Adjutant General or TAG of a state is an elected or 
appointed position and joint experience requirements as outlined in DoDI 1300.19 do not 
apply. As such, the differences in joint experience and joint requirements among Title 10 
Active Duty and Title 32 National Guard members are factors that lead to a cultural 
conflict.  
3. One Team but Not One Fight 
The slogan “one team-one fight” is synonymous throughout military culture and 
often used to describe the positive and constructive nature in which military members, 
who may serve in different capacities or services, work together to accomplish a common 
goal. No one service branch is credited for using this motto and all too often “one team-
one fight” refers to joint operations between service members from the Army, Navy, Air 
Force and Marine Corps. Each of the services and components have their own cultural 
dynamics that set them apart, yet when the duty calls, service members look past their 
cultural differences and work together to conduct a successful mission. In particular, 
active and reserve members operate as one team for missions that have been part of the 
overseas contingencies of the past 10 years. As General Gordon Sullivan (Ret) put it, 
“after a decade of war in which active duty and reserve troops served side-by-side, the 
sweat of shared sacrifice should wash away lingering rivalries, particularly among the 
younger generation of service members” (Nagl & Sharp, 2010, p. 7). 
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In the DSCA mission set in the homeland, the concept of “one team-one fight” is 
often more difficult to achieve. During Hurricane Katrina, “the White House, Congress, 
multiple think tanks, and the public observed dysfunctional relationships and lack of 
unity of command and effort by Federal and state forces” (Burkett, 2008). However, it is 
possible to overcome communication and/or cultural barriers between the active and 
reserve components as seen with successful overseas operations. Yet, in the homeland, 
the area of operations in which the “team” is carrying out the “fight” is more 
complicated. Federalism and state sovereignty impact the roles and responsibilities of 
service members among the Title 10 Active Duty and Title 32 National Guard, which 
leads to differences when they interact and are expected to respond in a unified manner. 
The result is a conflict of who is in charge, the President and a state governor, which then 
manifests into command and control struggles among Title 10 and Title 32 members. 
Hence, developing one “team” to come together for one “fight” is inherently difficult 
when different leaders are in command and control of parallel but separate chains of 
command in the homeland.  
These detached chains of command have not been conducive to synchronizing 
efforts among Title 10 and Title 32 military members for operations in the homeland. 
Multiple examples abound in which these distinctively disparate chains of command 
negatively impact operations and create perceptions that have impacted the cultural 
dynamic between them. In reference to Title 10 Active Duty support efforts, Burkett 
reports that in 2005 during Hurricane Wilma, “Governor Jeb Bush of Florida called the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, and complained that the Federal 
Government’s unilateral actions were insulting to him personally and to the citizens of 
Florida” (Burkett, 2008). The perception that the Title 10 Active Duty as “Big Army” 
will come in and take over domestic response operations in a state still exists and adds to 
the cultural conflict between the Active Duty and National Guard.  
In response to questions regarding coalition operations in Libya in 2011, 
Secretary Robert Gates replied, “this command and control business is complicated” 
(Martin, 2011). Concerns over command and control and exactly who is leading the  
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effort is nothing new; however, a cultural conflict has resulted over time among mission 
partners in the homeland and should be addressed in a new way to ensure “one team” to 
protect U.S. citizens when disasters and emergencies occur. 
4. A New Outlook Focused on Appreciation for the New C2 
Resolving the tension or conflict that results from underlying cultural difference 
among Title 10 and Title 32 members of the military can be done but it will take a new, 
shared outlook focused on appreciation for culture and context, the new C2. For Title 10 
and Title 32 military, “intergroup contact and attitude change” can resolve conflict and 
may help create unity of effort among them (Robinson & Tajfel, 1996, p. 183). Changing 
attitudes is a long-term effort but one that can be accomplished by continuous intergroup 
contact and leaders who emphasize a new outlook. Leaders can generate a shift in the 
attitudes of their subordinates or followers and develop or change institutional behaviors. 
The trick is institutionalizing this shift focused on a new outlook that demonstrates trust, 
respect and mutual understanding. Previous USNORTHCOM Commanders have been 
focused on making headway to build trust, specifically General Gene Renuart and 
Admiral James Winnefeld during their tenure. General Gene Renuart emphasized 
anticipating the needs and requests of civilian authorities and believed that building 
relationships before a disaster was paramount (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2010). 
By many accounts, Admiral James Winnefeld built trust and confidence with Title 32 
National Guard and state civilian authorities during his tenure as Commander of 
USNORTHCOM. Thus, institutionalizing this positive exchange will yield better results 
for unity of effort in the future. During the confirmation hearing of Lieutenant General 
Charles Jacoby before the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 28, 2011, Admiral 
Winnefeld’s successor stated, “I’ll commit to you that I will continue to develop those 
relationships and have that strong—strong, trusting, working partnership that's required 
for support to the states and the civil authorities for the defense of the homeland” (Senate 
Armed Services Committee, July 28, 2011). Continuing the progress that has been made 
increases the ability for a new outlook to be institutionalized not only at USNORTHCOM 
but also among active duty military.  
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As part of a new outlook, it is imperative that Title 10 active duty members 
understand the Title 32 National Guard context and convey a recognition that Guardsmen 
know their state and what a community needs. In a demonstration of this new focus on a 
new C2, Admiral James Winnefeld, wrote on his Commander’s Blog within the post “The 
Need for Good Relationships,” that “the governors and adjutants general know their 
states. They know the people in their states. They know the unique laws of their state. 
They know the terrain, and they know what resources the state has available” (NORAD 
& USNORTHCOM Commander's Blog, 2011). Leaders who set a new tone and lead by 
example enhance the likeliness that barriers will be broken.  
With that in mind, an increased emphasis on understanding the capabilities 
resident among Title 32 National Guard within a given state or community is essential to 
demonstrating appreciation for their capacity during operations and knowing ahead of 
time how to augment those capabilities. It is important to consider that traditional 
National Guardsmen have full-time civilian careers, which shapes their role and 
perspective as a Guardsman differently than full-time active duty members. As such, 
work experience outside the military construct further contributes to the National Guard 
context. Ultimately, overcoming cultural barriers means appreciating the context that 
shapes an organization and its people.  
This concept of understanding and upholding culture and context is currently 
being translated into a command and control structure founded in the Dual-Status 
Commander initiative. The Council of Governors proposed the dual-status commander 
construct: 
The secretary of defense opened the policy door with his willingness to 
consider dual status command authorities to address the Governors’ 
concerns. This enabled the new commander of U.S. Northern Command 
(NORTHCOM), Admiral Winnefeld, to identify key middle ground, and 
shift course to a new vision on this critical issue. (Schumacher, 2011) 
On April 14, 2011, President Barack Obama delegated functions and authorities to the 
Secretary of Defense to authorize Title 10 Active Duty and Title 32 National Guard 
officers to accept a dual status command authority over both Title 10 and Title 32  
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military members (The White House, April 14, 2011). The dual-status commander 
initiative symbolizes a cultural shift and a “new vision” focused on flexibility and 
compromise in this every-changing threat environment.  
5. Setting a “Superordinate Goal” to Unite Them 
In addition to establishing a new outlook on culture and context, Title 10 and Title 
32 military members are moving in a direction of setting a collective “superordinate 
goal.” The principle of a “superordinate goal” is defined as two groups working closely 
and cooperatively to reach a common task or goal (Sherif, 1958). This social science 
principle can be used to reduce intergroup conflict and unify organizations as they work 
together (Sherif, 1958). The Joint Action Plan on Unity of Effort is one of example where 
Title 10 and Title 32 military members have worked together to codify a plan and new 
way of reaching unity of effort. Creating unity of effort seems to be their collective 
“superordinate goal” and establishing an action plan along with the many conversations 
and discussions included in that planning process has helped reduce conflict.  
C. LEARNING FROM DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES TO CREATE UNITY 
OF EFFORT 
Learning about new ideas and ways in which to solve a problem, particularly after 
a disaster occurs, is normal (Birkland, 2006). However, learning from disasters does not 
always translate into policy change. As previously discussed in Chapter I, response 
operations to Hurricane Katrina were not unified among Title 10 and Title 32 military; 
yet, the policy changes to facilitate that this lesson has been learned have not produced 
real unity of effort. Note, of course, that many initiatives have been established to address 
this lesson, such as department directives, executive orders, policy and training as 
discussed in Chapter II. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether learning from 
disconnected military response operations to Hurricane Katrina has turned into an 
effective change in policy that yields unity of effort. Several recent initiatives have 
moved the ball forward with regard to learning that leads to policy change. The types of 
learning that have occurred from these initiatives and what has resulted are examined.  
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1. Social Policy Learning 
In Lessons of Disaster, social policy learning is characterized as:  
Learning goes beyond simple adjustments in program management to the 
heart of the problem itself, including attitudes towards program goals and 
the nature and appropriateness of government action…Social policy 
learning involves the interplay of ideas about how problems come about 
and how they can be solved, and is much more likely to engage ideology 
and belief systems. (Birkland, 2006, p. 16) 
Social policy learning has been at the root of the Council of Governors in its effort to 
resolve command and control issues to create unity of effort. The council meetings and 
follow-on correspondence has afforded an opportunity for stakeholders at the federal and 
state levels to discuss unity of effort to share ideas, resolve issues, and ultimately, impact 
policy. In essence, the council environment has maintained each stakeholder’s 
institutional beliefs but allowed social policy learning to occur so that the stakeholders 
understand and appreciate the perspective of other institutions.  
2. Political Learning 
In addition to social policy learning, political learning is also happening within 
the Council of Governors. Lessons of Disasters defines political learning as, “learning 
about strategy for advocating a given policy idea or problem leading potentially to more 
sophisticated advocacy or a policy idea or problem” (Birkland, 2006, pp. 16–17). 
Political learning should not be distorted as a negative thing. The council consists of 
political partners and the issue of unity of effort is directly tied to federalism. Thus, it is 
natural that policymakers and political actors participating in the council would 
experience political learning.  
3. Summary of Learning Types and Impact on Policy Change 
As the council has worked together on unity of effort, views have changed given 
the new policy options that have been offered. For example, Contingency Dual-Status 
Command is a shift in policy that the DoD and USNORTHCOM offered to alleviate state 
and National Guard concerns about command and control of military forces, both Title 10 
and Title 32, operating in a state. This shift in policy over command and control of forces 
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has altered the landscape among stakeholders or “institutions” and as such social policy 
learning and political learning have occurred. Both learning types have contributed to the 
effectiveness of the council and real policy change in the Dual-Status Command 
Initiative. This, in turn, has been a “focusing event” that has reinvigorated attention to a 
pre-existing idea, involuntary mobilization of federal reserve military forces for 
emergencies and disasters in the homeland (Birkland, 2006, p. 165). The council 
considered this policy change and offering a proposal to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee and the House Armed Services Committee to be considered and included in 
the FY12 National Defense Authorization Act. 
The Council of Governors is an ideal demonstration of dismantling institutional 
pathologies to learn and develop appreciation for different perspectives. The institutions 
involved with the learning are not abandoning their beliefs but are clearly willing to 
consider ideas, new and old, to truly learn lessons and change policy to develop unity of 
effort. “The analysis shows that disaster-related learning and policy change can occur at 
the state as well as the national level” (Birkland, 2006, p. 104). Known best practices 
found in other organizations and history can help develop policy needed for disaster-
related learning.  
D. LEARNING FROM PROVEN BEST PRACTICES 
The Home Front Command in Israel and the Florida Division of Emergency 
Management have both had success in creating unity of effort among their respective 
mission partners. Valuable policies and practices have contributed to their ability to 
create unity of effort. Various practices are applicable to developing a new outlook and 
approach on creating unity of effort among Title 10 and Title 32 military members.  
The Israeli Home Front Command and Florida Division of Emergency 
Management experience can be useful to U.S. military coordination apparatus to enhance 
unity of effort during DCSA missions. However, a nuanced approach emphasizing a 
mutual understanding of federalism and sovereignty is critical. It is difficult to draw an 
exact parallel relationship to the Title 10 and Title 32 military response because of the 
various organizations at state and federal levels that complicate this dynamic. However, 
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best practices from these international and domestic cases can support a new and nuanced 
approach. Israel and Florida have several best practices in common, which further 
supports the argument that these organizations have successful practices and policies that 
lead to unified operations. The best practices are now discussed as follows. 
1. Culture of Preparation 
Israel and Florida have had to adapt because of the threats their citizens face. In 
their culture of preparation, Israel strengthened its civil defense through multiple defense 
policies and Florida became a “megacommunity” by focusing on the community and 
building partnerships. Experience with terrorist attacks and natural disasters have forced 
these “states” to take new and necessary steps to create unity among their response 
mission partners. The analysis supports the argument that societies who experience 
disasters, manmade or natural, are prone to take action to prepare and prevent future 
incidents.  
Natural and manmade disasters or emergencies will impact Americans in the 
future. It is not a matter of if but when U.S. military forces, Title 10 and Title 32, must be 
ready to support in a unified manner. A New Madrid earthquake scenario that impacts 
multiple states and thousands of citizens would most certainly require a cohesive and 
unified response from Title 10 and Title 32 military forces. While many other devastating 
scenarios are likely, the New Madrid seismic zone was recently addressed in May 2011 
as the National Level Exercise (NLE) that involved local, state and federal coordination. 
It is well known among the scientific community that a New Madrid earthquake could be 
utterly catastrophic, affecting seven or more states, countless buildings and infrastructure, 
nuclear power plants and residential homes (U.S. Geological Survey, 2009). The 1811 
New Madrid earthquake and aftershocks through 1812 were felt from the Mississippi 
River valley to Pittsburgh, PA (U.S. Geological Survey, 1974). Figure 9 shows the 
estimated coverage and acceleration of an earthquake along the New Madrid fault. 
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Figure 9.   Peak ground acceleration (From: Mid America Earthquake Center, 2009) 
To compare the New Madrid seismic zone with other regional seismic zones in the 
United States, see Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10.   Comparison of New Madrid earthquake in 1895 and Northridge, CA 
earthquake in 1994 (From: National Infrastructure Analysis Center, 2007, p. 
4).  
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The National Infrastructure and Analysis Center (NISAC) conducted a study in 2007 
assessing damage to energy infrastructure from a New Madrid earthquake on a national 
scale. The areas in the study analyzed were national gas service, crude oil and refined 
product service, the transport of coal by river and electric power generation and 
transmission (National Infrastructure Analysis Center, 2007). Of course, measurements 
can change depending on the severity of the earthquake but NISAC’s estimates in each 
energy sector were drastically impacted and major challenges in restoration would occur 
for weeks or months (National Infrastructure Analysis Center, 2007, p. 40). Data 
collected by the Mid American Earthquake Center (MAE) for the NLE on the New 
Madrid seismic zone reported that “nearly 715,000 buildings are damaged in the eight-
state study region…about 42,000 search and rescue personnel working in 1,500 teams are 
required to respond to the earthquakes” (Mid America Earthquake Center, 2009). In 
addition, the study by MAE estimates that “three days after the earthquake, 7.2 million 
people are still displaced and 2 million people seek temporary shelter” (Mid America 
Earthquake Center, 2009). These assessments and numbers are eye opening and provide 
context of what is at risk in the region depending on the severity of the earthquake. Much 
can be learned from the ongoing struggle to rebuild in Haiti, Japan and New Zealand after 
they experienced devastating damage to infrastructure following the results of 
earthquakes. 
A New Madrid earthquake would impact thousands if not millions of Americans 
as these studies project, which would most certainly require support from Title 10 and 
Title 32 military members. Creating a culture of preparation not only means developing 
unity of effort among Title 10 and Title 32 military members but this scenario also 
highlights the need for additional personnel to assist in the response and recovery efforts. 
Referring to Dr. Chris Bellavita, Tussing writes, “Bellavita declared, ‘people are always 
going to be a part of response; the bigger the incident, the more the people.’ Hence, in the 
preparations leading up to and through our exercises, organizers should ‘make room for 
the people’” (Tussing, 2011). In other words, a “mega catastrophe” or disaster of this  
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magnitude may require additional assets and those in the Title 10 federal reserve could 
help save lives and mitigate suffering. Mitigation, according to Birkland, “is any action 
that would lessen the impact of a natural disaster” (Birkland, 2006, p. 106). 
According to the “The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned,” 
response time to an emergency or disaster is critical in the effort to save lives and 
mitigate suffering when, “time equals lives saved” (The White House, 2006, p. 53). It is 
often said that there is not an established “requirement” or need for Title 10 Federal 
Reserve forces to respond to emergencies or disasters in the homeland. However, Title 10 
Federal Reserve service members are dispersed in units around the United States and may 
be closer in proximity respond to an emergency. Also, in this new debt-conscious 
environment, the DoD needs to explore new and creative ways to use forces and assets 
efficiently. Access to Title 10 Federal Reserve forces that are closer in proximity to an 
emergency or disaster in the homeland may reduce the cost currently expended to 
transport other Title 10 and Title 32 military to the incident. In a Senate Floor statement, 
the co-chair of the Senate Guard Caucus, Senator Christopher “Kit” Bond, stated, “time 
and time again, we have seen Reserve units stationed within close proximity to a natural 
or manmade disaster forced to stand by and watch when they could have been assisting 
injured victims in preventing loss of property” (Bond, 2009). In 2007, the DoD could not 
call upon various Title 10 Federal Reserve units stationed in California that could have 
assisted the state during emergency response efforts for ongoing wildfires. These Title 10 
Federal Reserve units include the following. 
• 13,568 U.S. Army Reserve personnel 
• U.S. Marine Corps helicopters (CH-47) at Camp Pendleton and Edwards 
Air Force Base (AFB), CA 
• U.S. Air Force Reserve air evacuation and air transportation aircraft (C-17 
and C-5) at Travis AFB and March Air Reserve Base (ARB), CA 
• U.S. Air Force Reserve medical group at Travis AFB, CA 
Similarly, in 2008, before landfall and following Hurricane Ike, the DoD could not call 
upon Federal Reserve units stationed in Texas to support the emergency response efforts. 
The Federal Reserve units include the following. 
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• 18,164 U.S. Army Reserve personnel 
• U.S. Army Reserve helicopters (CH-47 and UH-60) at Fort Hood, TX 
• U.S. Air Force Reserve air evacuation aircraft (C-17 and C-5) at Lackland 
AFB, TX 
• U.S. Navy Reserve air transport aircraft (C-9) at Fort Worth Naval Air 
Station Joint Reserve base, TX 
• U.S. Marine Corps transportation units in Lubbock, TX 
As Admiral Winnefeld stated in his April 2011 hearing before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, “we would never want to have to come to this committee and explain why 
we were not able to bring all elements of national power to bear to help American 
citizens that are in danger” (Senate Armed Services Committee, April 5, 2011, p. 8). 
Thus, as part of developing a culture of preparation, changing policy and legislation that 
would allow Title 10 Federal Reserve forces to assist with disasters and emergencies 
would be prudent.  
2. One Chain of Command 
Israel synchronizes its response operations under the Home Front Command and 
Florida activates its State Emergency Response Team under the Florida Division of 
Emergency Management during its emergency response operations. The research 
demonstrates that effective, unified response efforts are due in part to the single chain of 
command. A streamlined construct for command and control has allowed both Israel and 
Florida to communicate and coordinate with all of their partners so that they can operate 
in a synchronized manner.  
Currently, Title 10 and Title 32 military members operate under two separate but 
parallel chains of command, as previously addressed. The concept of a dual-status 
commander leading both chains of command has been viewed as an approach to bridge 
them together and create a cohesive, unified response effort for Title 10 and Title 32 
military in the homeland. This concept has been tested in pre-planned National Special 
Security Events or NSSE’s but has not been tested fully during real-world, no-notice 
events. As discussed in Chapter III, the Council of Governors put forward the 
Contingency Dual-Status Command Concept or CDSC as a method to create unity of 
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effort between Title 10 and Title 32 military operating in a state. In November 2010, a 
proof-of-concept tabletop exercise was conducted in Florida and participants, including 
the Florida Division of Emergency Management, Florida National Guard, National Guard 
Bureau, US Northern Command, Federal Emergency Management Agency-Region IV 
and the Region IV Defense Coordinating Element, agreed, “that the Dual Status 
Commander concept will improve Unity of Effort” (Schumacher, 2011). The Council of 
Governors forged ahead with the training support of USNORTHCOM and continued its 
training of dual-status commander at their headquarters in Colorado Springs, CO. The 
dual-status commander training is for both Title 10 and Title 32 military and it has been 
described that if a Title 32 National Guardsman is the dual-status commander that the 
deputy would be Title 10 and vice versa. In his hearing on July 27, 2011 before the 
House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Chief of the National Guard 
Bureau, General Craig McKinley testified on dual-status commanders and stated, “I'm 
pleased to report that we're making great progress in that area. 38 states have the dual 
status commander already trained. The rest will be in the next class in Colorado Springs” 
(House Armed Services Committee, 2011). The dual-status command concept has been 
well received by all mission partners as a step in the right direction to resolve unity of 
effort issues between Title 10 and Title 32 military. This concept is making incredible 
strides by also bringing these partners together to work on a common goal, which has 
enhanced their overall partnership.  
3. Formalize the Process 
Both Israel and Florida established authorities or requirements that ensure mission 
partners support their defense and emergency response apparatus. Israel has several 
statutes that mandate reserve military and civilian participation during emergency 
response operations in the state. Florida made planning requirements for their local 
communities to develop a cohesive state mitigation plan. While changing or adding 
statutory authorities and planning requirements could be an option in the United States 
for Title 10 and Title 32 military, it is unlikely that this path would harbor good will 
among mission partners. However, formalizing the process for unity of effort can take 
shape in other ways, some of which are occurring through the Council of Governors.  
 90
The Joint Action Plan on Unity of Effort has been formally accepted and agreed-
upon among the Council of Governors, which has helped codify operational needs and 
desires among governors and Title 10 and Title 32 military when responding to disasters 
or emergencies in a state. The five areas emphasized in the Joint Action are dual-status 
command, shared situational awareness, joint reception, staging, onward movement, and 
integration (JRSOI), mission assignments/pre-scripted mission assignments and planning 
(Stockton, 2011). Implementation guidance is forthcoming given that the Council of 
Governors has approved the plan.  
On July 17, 2011, the Council of Governors unanimously approved a MOA 
template that “prescribes the protocols and procedures for the establishment, operation, 
and disestablishment of dual-status commanders” when operating in a state (Stockton, 
2011). The formal agreement in the MOA made with each state creates a new policy 
without establishing requirements or adding new authorities. In addition, the Council of 
Governors also unanimously approved a legislative proposal that would involuntarily 
activate Title 10 Federal Reserve forces in response to an emergency or disaster in the 
homeland (Stockton, 2011). This proposal would not only be a formal policy change in 
statute but it symbolizes an enormous paradigm shift among stakeholders in the last 
several years with regard to the use of Title 10 forces in a state. Indeed, the Chairmen of 
Council of Governors transmitted the legislative proposal to the Senate and House Armed 
Services Committee with their support to be included in the FY12 NDAA (Panetta, 
2011). On August 11, 2011, Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, also sent letters of 
support for the legislative proposal to the House and Senate Armed Services Committee 
for inclusion in the FY12 NDAA (Panetta, 2011).  
E. SUMMARY 
Appreciation for institutional pathologies, cultures and various perspectives 
increases the ability for individuals and organizations to develop a mutual understanding 
and growth. Learning, in the sense of lessons learned from disasters, can lead to policy 
change that has practical implications for successful operations among mission partners. 
Relying on tested and proven models or policies to rationalize policy change offers 
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reasonable support that policy should and can be altered for the better. Real-world events 
are occurring that address policy change, through formal agreements and statutorily, that 
could resolve conflict and create unity of effort for Title 10 and Title 32 military 
responding to disasters and emergencies in the homeland. This chapter was meant to 
highlight the case study best practices and the ongoing paradigm shift to bridge the 
knowledge gap among Title 10 and Title 32 military members. Chapter VI takes these 
concepts a step further and offer recommendations for next steps to build one, unified 
team from Title 10 and Title 32 military members.  
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VI. CLOSING THOUGHTS ON UNITY OF EFFORT  
It always seems impossible until it's done 
– Nelson Mandela 
A. INTRODUCTION 
When the author began this research project in the fall of 2010, creating unity of 
effort between Title 10 and Title 32 military members seemed like an unlikely prospect 
plagued by various competing interests by multiple stakeholders. The complex history 
among these stakeholders resulted in a stalemate that required genuine partnership 
building to make progress. Indeed, in the past year, a “real-time” genuine partnership was 
forged and this is a fundamental factor to this thesis as the research and findings were 
unfolding as the partnerships were building. The author hoped that through this research 
project, she would contribute to the unity of effort dialogue by addressing the knowledge 
gap that stifled communication among the stakeholders and also attempt to synthesize an 
effective way forward. The “real-time” factor and subsequent progress contributes greatly 
to the applicability of the research and analysis by filling the knowledge gap and 
pointedly shaping a way ahead. By many accounts, the state of affairs on unity of effort 
between Title 10 and Title 32 military has done a complete 180-degree swing in the right 
direction whereby genuine partnership building has paid off and the stakeholders are 
reaching consensus on multiple issues of vested interest.  
B. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
The findings and analysis have addressed the research questions that drove this 
project. It was essential to ascertain why unity of effort between Title 10 and Title 32 
military was not a reality. Investigating the events, opinions and comments involving 
multiple stakeholders helped define exactly what had happened in the past to shape the 
knowledge gap and division that was at play. The fact is, Hurricane Katrina highlighted 
the problem but other factors hindered the requisite partnership building and compromise 
needed to create unity of effort from the top down. To this point, addressing the power 
factor as it relates to federalism and command and control was necessary as this was at 
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the core of the stalemate. The complex history was broken down chronologically and by 
issue area to provide the reader an opportunity to understand the perspectives from 
various stakeholders, which includes the legislative activity and proposals at odds that 
served as contentious issues among the stakeholders and before Congress. 
Consequently, it was also important to address the vitality of a formal mechanism 
for the stakeholders to come together for genuine partnership building to reach consensus 
on creating unity of effort. Indeed, Congress had a hand in the development of a formal 
mechanism and the Council of Governors has been the center of gravity for creating an 
environment in which state governors, the National Guard and DoD leadership can come 
together to discuss issues and reach a compromise. The formality of the Council of 
Governors led to other formal and operational mechanisms to create unity of effort, such 
as the Joint Action Plan for Unity of Effort, MOAs between the DoD and states on the 
dual-status command construct and the legislative proposal from the DoD to call-up Title 
10 federal reserve forces in response to emergencies and disasters.  
The case study findings from the Israeli Home Front Command and Florida 
Division of Emergency Management further prove that formal mechanisms among 
stakeholders and policies, particularly those focused on a unified response, will improve 
unity of effort. The best practices gleaned from Israel and Florida demonstrates that unity 
of effort can be a reality and the newly established mechanisms mentioned above are 
building blocks towards that effort. Of the best practices found in Israel and Florida, 
those most applicable to Title 10 and Title 32 unity of effort were building a culture of 
preparation, creating one chain of command and formalizing the process to do so. The 
analysis also highlighted other underlying areas related to culture and context that have 
hindered Title 10 and Title 32 military members from creating unity of effort. Theories 
and concepts regarding social identity, institutional pathology, the new C2 of culture and 
context, in-group and out-group conflict, setting a “superordinate goal” and learning 
types were all analyzed to provide the reader, particularly Title 10 and Title 32 military, 
with a greater appreciation and perspective with the hope of closing the knowledge gap 
so that differences may be overcome to reach unity of effort.  
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Lastly, it is also a reality that disasters may occur that are so catastrophic that 
access to Title 10 Federal Reserve forces may be necessary. It is fair to say that among 
the stakeholders, little debate has transpired on the value of having additional forces from 
the Title 10 Federal Reserve available to respond to disasters and emergencies; rather, the 
consternation has been about command and control of those Title 10 Federal Reserve 
forces when employed in a state. Since the Council of Governors agreed on the dual-
status command construct and a MOA to formalize it, state governors and the National 
Guard are now more comfortable with the legislative change to Title 10 Sec 12304 to 
allow Title 10 federal reservists to be involuntarily called up to respond to a disaster or 
emergency. Indeed, on August 18, 2011 the co-chairs of the Council of Governors 
submitted letters of support for this proposal to the Senate and House Armed Services 
Committees and stated, “we are pleased to present the legislative proposal for your 
consideration and request your support in passing the legislation as part of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012” (Branstad & Gregoire, 2011).  
The research questions assisted the author in shaping the knowledge gap among 
Title 10 and Title 32 military members. The case studies, as well as the real-time 
solutions resulting from the Council of Governors, helped answer the questions to fill this 
gap.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The author believes that the Joint Action Plan on Unity of Effort, the MOAs on 
dual-status command and the legislative proposal to involuntarily call up Title 10 federal 
reservists will effectively meet some of the best practices founded in Israel and Florida. It 
should be noted that while support for the legislative proposal to amend Title 10 Sec 
12304 from the Council of Governors is paramount, the author believes that Congress 
should not hesitate to include this proposal in the FY12 NDAA. The author considers a 
cultural shift between Title 10 and Tile 32 military the next hurdle that necessitates 
attention while implementing these initiatives. The following recommendations are meant 
to take these initiatives to the next level. 
 96
The first set of recommendations on experience and education are based on 
findings in Chapter V resulting from the differences and cultural conflict between the 
active and reserve components. To emphasize specifically the “new C2,” or culture and 
context, the DoD could take a cue from the much-needed cultural shift that occurred 
following the implementation of Goldwater-Nichols, which completely changed the way 
U.S. military forces operate in a joint environment. In doing so, the institutionalized 
recommendations from Goldwater-Nichols created new ways for service members to 
learn new skills and expand their thinking (Harm & Hunt, 2009). History has shown that 
collaborative and joint operations are more successful, whereby “Desert Storm and 
subsequent military operations have proven the effectiveness of this policy decades after 
its enactment” (Harm & Hunt, 2009). The clear success of military operations following 
the implementation of these objectives from Goldwater-Nichols demonstrated that 
creating a unified force structure better enabled the U.S. military to conduct more 
effective operations. While the exact circumstances are certainly dissimilar, comparisons 
involving inter-service or inter-component cultural differences and command and control 
structure are applicable. In keeping with a recommendation from the Commission on the 
National Guard and Reserve, the author recommends that members of the reserve 
component, both Title 10 and Title 32, should be exposed to increased opportunities for 
joint experience and joint qualification. These “periodic tours with the active component” 
will increase exposure to overcome cultural differences (Commission on the National 
Guard and Reserve, 2008, p. 30). In addition, Nagl and Sharp suggest, “education is the 
most effective way to overcome the lingering active-reserve component cultural divide” 
(Nagl & Sharp, 2010). The author recommends an expansion of curriculum in PME that 
focuses on the homeland and defense support to civil authorities, which would not only 
improve the active duty understanding of operations in the homeland but would serve to 
mend cultural conflict with the reserve component. The current DSCA course offered at 
USNORTHCOM is effective but has not reached a larger audience of Title 10 and Title 
32 military members. Offering educational curriculum at other established schools would 
be valuable to this end. Of course, opportunities in training and exercises are an effective 
way to truly bring people together, but prolonged tours of working alongside a member 
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of the opposite component in an office or in the classroom will facilitate communication 
and interdisciplinary learning. Just as tours overseas create a bond over a common 
experience, so will opportunities with joint experience and education, which will also 
make reserve members more attractive for promotion in higher ranks.  
The second set of recommendations is also based on findings in Chapter V from 
the case studies in Florida and Israel in which partnership and preparation is vital to an 
operational unity of effort. Title 10 members also need advantages for increased exposure 
to their counterparts in the reserve component, specifically Title 32 members, to 
appreciate culture and context for operations in the homeland. As most Title 10 forces are 
contingency sourced for operations in the homeland, it is difficult to select those specific 
units that may work alongside Title 32 military, and thus, would benefit from additional 
contact. Accordingly, the author is concentrating on the newly formed dual-status 
command concept to specify members of the Title 10 Active Duty who are most likely to 
work alongside Title 32 National Guard in an operational environment. As previously 
discussed, the MOA on dual-status command designates a commander and deputy 
commander from opposite components. Currently, designated dual-status commanders 
and only a few deputy commanders are attending a dual-status commander training and 
education course at USNORTHCOM. The author recommends that deputy commanders 
be designated simultaneously when dual-status commanders are designated so they can 
attend the course together. Essentially, if this pair is to execute the dual-status command 
concept together and represent their components up the chain of command, then it seems 
logical that they also attend training at the same time and take advantage of the 
experience together. It is the author’s opinion that the success of the dual-status command 
may be contingent on the nature of the relationship between the commander and his 
deputy, and thus, initiating the relationship building from the beginning and before an 
incident strikes seems constructive. In addition, as of August 25, 2011, approximately 40 
Title 32 National Guard members have received dual-status command training from 
USNORTCHOM. Unfortunately, not one Title 10 active duty member has attended the 
dual-status command training. The author recommends that the DoD and 
USNORTHCOM take the requisite steps to select and train Title 10 active duty members 
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as dual-status commanders. While the author acknowledges that a Title 32 National 
Guard member may be the likely commander for most scenarios, the DoD was specific 
not to eliminate the possibility of a Title 10 dual-status commander. As such, 
USNORTHCOM should also train Title 10 active duty members for this command 
construct and responsibility.  
The third recommendation is based on the findings in Chapter V regarding the 
influence of leadership in Florida that helped bring partners together, create a collective 
“megacommunity” and build unity of effort for emergency management operations. The 
Council of Governors has been successful in bringing senior leaders to the table to 
discuss tough topics and reach a compromise on multiple issues. The author recommends 
the creation of a similar group setting for the senior military and civilian leaders in the 
DoD who have a role in DSCA missions in the homeland and creating unity of effort for 
Title 10 and Title 32 military from the top down. The group could also meet the intent 
emphasizing a cultural paradigm shift to breakdown Title 10 and Title 32 cultural 
barriers. These senior military leaders would include the Army, Navy, Air Force and 
Marine Corps Service Chiefs and the Reserve Component Chiefs, the Chief of the 
National Guard Bureau, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs 
and the Commander of USNORTHCOM. The routine meeting and participation of these 
members would institutionalize partnership building toward unity of effort to ensure that 
success is not contingent on an individual or a personality. The group setting would also 
formalize a means for these leaders to meet on any number of issues and set an example 
on the importance of partnerships to work through difficult topics openly and 
constructively.  
D. TO BE ADDRESSED 
While incredible strides are being made to strengthen partnerships among Title 10 
and Title 32 military to create unity of effort, further examination should be conducted to 
address the sustainment of an operational unity of effort. First, the dual-status command 
construct has been used for pre-planned events and was just recently employed for 
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Hurricane Irene in four states that had signed MOAs and trained dual-status commanders, 
which is the first time the dual-status command has been tested in a real-world event. 
Lessons learned from the dual-status command construct during Hurricane Irene will be 
forthcoming. As the MOAs are signed, the dual-status command will be implemented and 
its effectiveness to bridge command and control for Title 10 and Title 32 operators 
scrutinized. Testing dual-status command is certainly contingent on disasters and 
emergencies that vary in scale and severity. Thus, with each incident, different challenges 
must be overcome. If stakeholders maintain an open mind and utilize lessons learned 
from the dual-status command construct then it could be a successful and enduring 
agreement over time. Second, refocusing organizations to consider culture and context is 
a challenge and will take time. Training events, deployments, education, joint experience 
and exercises are several ways in which cultural differences can be addressed so that 
institutional pathologies and group conflict may be resolved to maintain unity of effort. 
As stated above, interdisciplinary opportunities in education and joint experience are 
areas that need increased attention when trying to build partnerships and resolve cultural 
differences.  
E. CONCLUSION  
Creating unity of effort between Title 10 and Title 32 military has been an enigma 
to many including the author. As is often said of many work environments, joint 
ventures, business partnerships or even passing a bill on Capitol Hill, it is all about 
relationships. It seems that relationships and a genuine interest to meet in the middle 
made the difference in reaching a compromise and forging a way ahead with actionable 
initiatives to create unity of effort. Addressing these initiatives and the actions of the 
stakeholders, both past and present, has helped bridge the knowledge gap that exists 
among them. The author believes that getting to one team to win the fight in the 
homeland through unity of effort is the “superordinate goal” at stake and this research 
demonstrates that attaining this goal is well underway.  
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